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PLEA BARGAINING AND THE TRIAL JUDGE,
THE NEW ABA STANDARDS, AND THE
NEED TO CONTROL JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
NORMAN LEFSTEIN t

With the continued use ofplea bargainingto dispose of criminal
cases, it is imperative thatplea bargaininglegislation andpracticesare
periodicaly reevaluatedto ensure that the rightsof criminaldefendants
areprotected In this Article, ProfessorLefstein scrutinizesplea bargainingpractices in North Carolina. Hefirst examines the currentplea
bargainingstatutes, and then the actualpractices that occur in North
Carolinacourts. Unfortunately, there are often inconsistenciesbetween
the two. The North Carolina legislation distinguishes itse/ffrom plea
bargainingstatutes developed by other states and by nationalorganizations in that it expressly allows judicialparticipationin the plea bargainingprocess. ProfessorLefstein examines thisjudicialactivity and
concludes that the lack of any externalstandardsforcontrol ofjudicial
participationand discretion has resulted in seriousproblems with the
North Carolina legislation. In a final section, Professor Lefstein reviews the newly revisedstandardsonplea bargainingestablishedby the
American BarAssociation. If enacted in North Carolina andin other
states, these standards would greatly improve plea negotiationprocedures. Unfortunately, these standardsthemselves areflawed,andProfessor Lefstein, who served as the Reporterin chargeof the development
of these standards, offers suggested amendments that would improve
them andprovideforfairerandmore consistentplea bargainingpractices.
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. LL.B., 1961, University
of Illinois College of Law; LL.M., 1964, Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Lefstein
has served since 1977 as a Reporter to the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Association Standards for Criminal Justice. His assignments as a Reporter included Chapter 14,
PLEAS OF GUILTY, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980), which is discussed
extensively in this Article.
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and Meg D. Goldstein (for their research assistance). Also appreciation is expressed to JoAnn
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The negotiated settlement of criminal cases by the prosecution and de-

fense, usually referred to as plea bargaining, is an integral part of America's
2
criminal courts.' Although criticism of plea bargaining remains common,
most commentators and organizations that have studied the criminal justice
system have concluded that despite problems and abuses, the practice is here
1. "The criminal justice system now disposes of virtually all cases of serious crime through
plea bargaining. Depending on the jurisdiction, as many as 99% of all felony convictions are by
plea. This nontrial procedure has become the ordinary dispositive procedure of American law."
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CH. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978). "Whether or not plea
bargaining was an integral part of 18th or 19th century colonial and American criminal justice, the
fact remains that it is here, that it is the primary method of case disposal ....
" H. Miller, Plea
Bargaining in the United States: Principals and Principles (1980) (unpublished manuscript,
Georgetown University Law Center). See M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCE
OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATrORNEYS 157 (1978).

Plea bargaining has been defined in various ways. Miller defines it as "the defendant's agreement to plead guilty to a criminal charge with the reasonable expectation of receiving some consideration from the state." Miller, sura, at ch. 1-1. A less inclusive definition is used by
Alschuler:
As I see the term, plea bargaining consists of the exchange of prosecutorial, judicial,
or other official concessions for pleas of guilty. This definition excludes unilateral exercises of prosecutorial or judicial discretion (such as an unqualified dismissal of charges),
and it also excludes the exchange of official concessions for information, testimony, restitution, or other actions by defendants that do not involve their self-conviction.
Alschuler, The DefenseAttornev'sRole in PleaBargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 n.6 (1975). See
also D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT

TRIAL (1966) and note 56 infra for a discussion of "implicit" plea bargaining. A definition of plea
bargaining is not contained in the North Carolina legislation. See note 18 infra.
2. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS (1973) [hereinafter cited as NAC COURTS]; Alschuler, The Trial

Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Judge's Role]; Alschuler, supra note 1; Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and
the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1(1975); Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in PleaBargaining,
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Arenella, Reforming the FederalGrandJury and the State Prelimnary Hearingto Prevent Conviction WithoutAdjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1980); Langbein,
supra note 1. See generally 13 LAW & Soc'y REV. 199-589 (1979) (special issue on plea bargain-

ing).
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to stay for the foreseeable future.3 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
not only has rejected constitutional challenges to plea bargaining, but also in
1971 termed the practice "an essential component of the administration of
criminal justice."'4 Accordingly, in recent years state legislatures, 5 the federal
courts, 6 and national organizations 7 have sought to develop procedures for its
effective control.
Rules designed to regulate plea bargaining in North Carolina were en-

acted in 1973.8 Unlike statutes in other jurisdictions, North Carolina law
states that the trial judge "may participate" in plea bargaining "discussions." 9
3. See, e.g., M. HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 162:
[T]o speak of a plea bargaining-free criminal justice system is to operate in a land of
fantasy. At a minimum, implicit plea bargaining would be the norm in the system that
abolished plea bargaining, and I suspect that not too much time would elapse before
explicit plea bargaining would again move to the fore.
H. Miller, supra note 1, at I1 ("Leaving aside all considerations of administrative or financial
...); Alschuler, Judge's Role,
necessity, some form of plea negotiation will probably persist.
supra note 2, at 1122 ("Plea negotiation will probably remain a central feature of the American
...); Rosenberg, Guidelinesto the JudgesRole
criminal justice system for the foreseeable future.
in Plea Negotiations, 14 THE JUDGE'S J. 46, 47 (1975). But cf. NAC COURTS, supra note 2, Standard 3.1 (condemning plea bargaining and calling for its total prohibition after 1978); M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WHITE, ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING 31 (1980):
We conclude that plea bargaining as an institution was clearly curtailed. The routine expectation of a negotiated settlement was removed; for most practitioners justifiable
reliance on negotiation to settle criminal cases greatly diminished in importance. There
is less face-to-face discussion between adversaries, and when meetings do occur, they are
not usually as productive as they used to be.
(Emphasis in original).
4. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
5. Presently, approximately 25 states in addition to North Carolina have statutes governing
plea bargaining: ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(a) (1973); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 43-25.3 (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1980); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-7-302 (1978); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.171
(1980); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. I 1A, § 402d (Smith-Hurd 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-5-6-1 (Burns
1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2, Rule 9 (West Supp. 1980); MD. R.P. (CRIM. CAUSES) 733 (Cum.
Supp. 1980); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) (1979); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 785 (1980); MINN. R. CRIM. P.
15.04(3) (1979); N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:9-2 (1976); N.M. R. CIuM. P. 21(g)(l) (1980); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 220.1-220.6 (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.D. R. CRIM. P. ll(d)(1) (Supp. 1979); OR. REV.
STAT. § 135.432 (1977); PA. R. CiuM. P. 319(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1980); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-7-8 to -7-9 (1979); TENN. R. CRIM. P. Ile (1977); TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 26.13
(Vernon Supp. 1979); VT. R. CRIM. P. 1le (1974); VA. R. Sup. CT. 3A-1 ld (1977); WASH. R. CRIM.
P. 4.2(e), (g) (1980); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 15(e) (1979).
6. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
7. E.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (ALI), MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-

DURE § 350.3 (proposed official draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as ALI CODE]; NAC COURTS, supra
note 2, at 42-65; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULES 441-44 (1974) [hereinafter cited as URCP]; ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, STANDARDS 14-3.1-3.4 (2d ed. 1980)

[hereinafter cited as ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY]. Because the NAC has recommended abolition of
all plea bargaining, its recommendations for the reform of the process are meant to apply only
until plea bargaining is eliminated. See NAC COURTS, supra note 2, STANDARD 3.1. The ALI,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the ABA have endorsed plea
negotiations. See ALI CODE, supra, § 350.3; URCP, supra, RULE 441, Comment; ABA PLEAS OF
GUILTY, supra, STANDARD 14-3.1, Commentary.
8. Law of April 11, 1974, ch. 1286, § 1, 2d Sess., 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 490 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1021 to 1027 (Supp. 1979)) (amended 1977).
9. Id § 15A-1021(a). See note 18 infra (text of statute). North Carolina is unusual in sanctioning explicit involvement of the judiciary in plea discussions. Only two other states, Vermont
and Illinois, explicitly authorize judicial involvement. Vermont conditions court participation on
the recording of the proceedings by a court reporter or recording equipment. VT. R. CRIM. P.
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This also differs from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and from stan-

dards approved by the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which expressly prohibit such judicial participation.10 In 1979, the American Bar Association revised its standards on plea bargaining and, contrary to the position it had adopted in its
1968 standards, authorized trial judges to participate in plea negotiations'
There is considerable difference, however, between the ABA standards concerning judicial participation and the North Carolina statute. 12
This Article examines the North Carolina legislation for the control of
plea negotiations, and the actual plea bargaining practices of the State's
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Also addressed is the broad discretionary power of trial judges to determine whether and in what manner to
participate in the plea negotiation process. 13 In a concluding section, the ArtiSll(e)(1) (1974). Illinois allows judicial participation so long as the judge does not initiate the
discussions. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 402d (Smith-Hurd .1976), construedin People v. Steele,
2011. App. 3d 879, 314 N.E.2d 531 (1974). Eleven states statutorily forbid judicial participation in
plea discussions: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. The remaining 12 states having plea
bargaining statutes do not directly address judicial participation in plea discussions: California,
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
Texas, and Washington. See statutes cited note 5 supra. All state statutes permit preliminary
considerations of plea agreements by the judge before the time for tender of the plea.
Authorization ofjudicial involvement in North Carolina plea discussions may be less significant than appears at first blush, because judicial participation occurs in some form in all systems.
See Alschuler, Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1061-1154; ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, at
14.84 & n.18. North Carolina is unique only in expressly sanctioning judicial participation in
preliminary discussions.
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(e)(l); ALI CODE, supra note 7, § 350.3; URCP, supra note 7, RULE
441(a); NAC COURTS, supra note 2, STANDARD 3.7.
11. ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, STANDARD 14-3.3(c)-(f) allows a substantial role
for the judge in the plea bargaining process. Subsection (c) permits the prosecution and defense to
request a conference with the judge to discuss plea arrangements if the parties have been unable to
arrive at an agreement on their own. Id 14-3.3(c). The court may then, if it wishes, meet with the
parties, and hear their presentations. The judge may indicate a plea acceptable to the court, or
may order a pre-plea report before announcing acceptable charge or sentence concessions. The
prosecution and defense may choose to accept or not accept the judge's offer. Id These procedures may result in the defendant learning the sentence contemplated by the court prior to the
time a guilty plea is entered. In addition, pursuant to subsection 14-3.3(b), if the parties have
reached a plea agreement, they may submit its terms to the court, for judicial approval. Id 143.3(b). If a plea agreement is not submitted to the judge and no conference requested, the ABA
allows the judge to ask whether negotiations have occurred and to adjourn the proceedings to
allow plea discussions to take place. Id 14-3.3(e).
The first edition of the ABA Standards on Guilty Pleas, ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
'CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 3.3(a) (1968), forbade
judicial participation in plea discussions. These standards, however, did allow the prosecution
and defense to reveal to the court, with the court's permission, an acceptable plea agreement
negotiated between them, and allowed the court to indicate acceptance or rejection of the agreement. Id 3.3(b). Subsection (b) ofthe revised standards, discussed in the preceding paragraph, is
similar.
12. See text accompanying notes 93-98 infra.
13. State statutes dealing with plea bargaining offer no guidance to the judge in deciding
whether to consider a plea agreement reached by prosecution and defense. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 25.3
(1977) is typical:
If a plea agreement has been reached
upon request of the parties the trial judge
may permit the disclosure to him of the agreement and the reasons therefor in advance
of the time for tender of the plea. He may then indicate whether he will concur in the
proposed disposition.
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cle reviews the newly revised ABA standards and recommends amendments to
the standards and to the plea negotiation statutes of North Carolina and other
states needed to assure fairer and more uniform treatment of criminal defend-

ants.
I. METHODOLOGY

During the summer of 1976 1 began collecting information on the manner

in which plea negotiations were conducted in North Carolina's criminal
courts. Initially, I visited one of the state's larger, multi-judge judicial districts
and conducted lengthy interviews with superior court judges, prosecutors,
public defenders, and private defense attorneys. A total of eighteen interviews
was conducted, each lasting between one and two hours on the average. Four

judges, six prosecutors (including the district prosecutor), four public defenders (including the district defender), and four private attorneys who devoted at
least half of their practices to criminal defense were interviewed. 14 At the outset, all interviewees were advised that neither the district in which they prac-

ticed nor their names would be published in any article developed from my
research. During all interviews I asked basically the same questions: How

does plea bargaining occur? What kinds of plea bargains are struck? To what
extent, if at all, do plea bargaining practices differ from what the state statute

contemplates? What roles do judges play in plea negotiations? I also observed
approximately six hours of court proceedings, involving three superior court
(Emphasis added). Provisions such as the foregoing are virtually identical to ABA PLEAS OF
GUILTY, supra note 7, STANDARD 14-3.3(b) and ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, STANDARD 3.3(b) (1968). See note 11
supra.
14. The method employed was a form of participant observation in which I attempted to
determine what occurs during plea bargaining by asking the participants. Attendance at plea
negotiations was not deemed feasible in this one-person study. For a discussion of participant
observation, see Gold, Roles in SociologicalField Observation, 36 SOCIAL FORCES 217-23 (1958).
The method and rationale used were similar to those employed by Alschuler in the research
that formed the basis of his articles on plea bargaining. See note 2 supra. Alschuler wrote of his
research method:
[I]n each city, I talked with prosecuI visited ten major urban jurisdictions ....
tors, defense attorneys, trial judges, and (usually) other criminal justice officials. My
interviews did not follow a set format, and the resulting study is not a scientific survey.
As I noted in an earlier article based on the same interviews [Alschuler, The Prosecutor's
Role in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968)], I have engaged in a kind of legal
journalism.
The utility of this kind of study seems to me to lie primarily in its ability to guide
analysis and to permit an evaluation of the inherency of the problems that it suggests.
Most of what I report is hearsay, and individual stories and observations may therefore
be suspect. Even unverified gossip may be valuable, however, when it "makes sense"when reflection indicates that our current system of criminal justice would inevitably
lead to behavior of the sort described in more than a few cases. Moreover, the hearsay
tends to become credible when similar observations are reported by persons with different and opposing roles in the criminal justice system and by persons in independent
jurisdictions across the nation.
Alschuler, supra note 1, at 1181 (footnote omitted). A criticism of Alschuler's research methodology, which is applicable partly to my own, is found in McDonald, Cramer & Rossman,
ProsecutorialBluffing and the Case Against Plea Bargaining,in PLEA BARGAINING 1-3 (W. McDonald & J. Cramer eds. 1980).
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judges, in which guilty pleas or no-contest pleas were tendered by defendants.
Following each day of data collection, typewritten summaries of all interviews
and court observations were prepared. In conversations reported in this Article, all statements enclosed in quotation marks are verbatim. All other remarks attributed to persons have been paraphrased.
To determine whether certain of the practices related during interviews
and courtroom observations were prevalent in other parts of the state, I mailed
a questionnaire during the summer of 1977 to the state's then fifty-six superior
court judges. 15 Replies were received from forty-four judges (seventy-nine
percent), although two judges sent general letters of response in lieu of the
questionnaire. Data from the completed questionnaires are presented in this
Article, although fewer than forty-two responses invariably are listed, as sometimes questions were not answered, or were answered in an ambiguous manner or in a way that suggested the question may not have been understood.
Because anonymity was promised if the questionnaire were returned, no
names ofjudges are reported. A copy of the questionnaire and its accompanying letter are reproduced in an appendix to this Article.
No claim is made that the findings presented in this Article are the product of a comprehensive, scientific inquiry. Interviews were conducted in only
one district, and there may well be some differences in plea bargaining practices in other parts of the state, particularly due to approaches of different
prosecutors.16 While a majority of the state's superior court judges responded
to the questionnaire, it is surely true that questionnaires are not as reliable as
would be more extensive interviews and observation. Furthermore, the data
for this study were collected several years ago.
Despite these disclaimers, I believe substantial truth respecting plea bargaining practices in North Carolina is revealed in this Article. Two principal
justifications account for my confidence, although admittedly the second reason is particularly lacking in scientific basis. First, the information derived
from interviews of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers was corroborated
by the questionnaire responses of the state's superior court judges. Second, in
February 1980, I was afforded the opportunity to speak to the state's superior
court judges concerning plea bargaining in North Carolina, at which time I
summarized my principal research findings. 17 In discussions with superior
15. As of 1980, there are 58 resident superior court judges in the state's 33 judicial districts.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-41 (Cum. Supp. 1979). In addition, there is authorization for appointment
of eight special superior court judges. Id § 7A-45.
16. See Bond, Plea Bargainingin North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. Rnv. 823 (1976). Bond notes
that practices vary widely from district to district, particularly with respect to the extent of bar-

gaining, factors that influence the prosecution's decision to negotiate, delegation of authority to
negotiate to staff district attorneys, and use of charge dismissals, charge reductions, and sentence

recommendations. Id Bond also reports that some judges "participate actively" in plea negotiations. Id at 826.
17. The presentation was made at the Conference of Superior Court Judges of North Carolina on February 22, 1980, in Pinehurst, North Carolina. Although the major research findings

contained in this Article were discussed in my presentation, no mention was made of the judicial
treatment of "recommended" and "agreed upon" sentences, because of time constraints and the
greater complexity of the findings. See text accompanying notes 46-50 infra.
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court judges following my presentation, many disagreed with certain of my

recommendations for change, but, significantly, not a single judge quarreled in
any way with my description of North Carolina plea bargaining practices and
the varying roles that judges perform. Indeed, I specifically asked several of
the judges if I had described the system in North Carolina accurately or if I
were in error in any way; the reply was always the same: "No, you've got it
right."
II.

NORTH CAROLINA'S STATUTE

The research findings in Part III can best be appreciated after examining
North Carolina's legislation governing plea bargaining. The state's plea bargaining statute, recommended by the state's Criminal Code Commission, follows a tentative draft of plea bargaining standards proposed by the American

Law Institute.18 Section 15A-1021(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes
authorizes prosecutors and defense attorneys in superior court to discuss the
possibility of a defendant's pleading guilty to one charge in return for the pros18. The official commentary that introduces Article 58, Procedures Relating to Guilty Pleas
in Superior Court, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A (1978 & Supp. 1979) states that the article was drafted
using AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tentative

Draft Number 5), ARTICLE 350 (1972) as a model. The relevant provisions of this 1972 ALI Code
closely parallel the proposed official draft of the ALI issued in 1975. See ALI CODE, supra note 7.
Article 58 consists of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1021 to 1027 (1978 & Supp. 1979). The key provisions discussed in this Article are §§ 15A-1021 to 1024, 1026:
§ 15A-1021. Plea conference; improper pressure prohibited; submission of arrangement to judge; restitution and reparation as part of plea arrangement agreement, etc.(a) In Superior Court, the prosecution and the defense may discuss the possibility
that, upon the defendant's entry of a plea of guilty or no contest to one or more offenses,
the prosecutor will not charge, will dismiss, or will move for the dismissal of other
charges, or will recommend or not oppose a particular sentence. If the defendant is
represented by counsel in the discussions the defendant need not be present. The trial
judge may participate in the discussions.
(b) No person representing the State or any of its political subdivisions may bring
improper pressure upon a defendant to induce a plea of guilty or no contest.
(c) If the parties have reached a proposed plea arrangement in which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence, they may with the permission of the
trial judge, advise the judge of the terms of the arrangement and the reasons therefor in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The proposed plea arrangement may include
a provision for the defendant to make restitution or reparation to an aggrieved party or
parties for the damage or loss caused by the offense or offenses committed by the defendant. Thejudge may indicate to the parties whether he will concur in the proposed disposition. The judge may withdraw his concurrence if he learns of information not
consistent with representations made to him.
(d) When restitution or reparation by the defendant is a part of the plea arrangement agreement, if the judge concurs in the proposed disposition he may order that
restitution or reparation be made as a condition of special probation pursuant to the
provisions of G.S. 15A-1351, or probation pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 15A1343(d). If an active sentence is imposed the court may order that the defendant make
restitution or reparation out of any earnings gained by the defendant if he attains work
release privileges under the provisions of G.S. 148-33.1, or that restitution or reparation
be imposed as a condition of parole in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 148-57.1.
The order providing for restitution or reparation shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of G.S. 15A-1343(d).
When restitution or reparation is ordered as a part of a plea arrangement or a condition of parole or work release privileges, the sentencing court shall enter as a part of the
commitment that restitution or reparation is ordered as part of a plea arrangement. The
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Administrative Office of the Courts shall prepare and distribute forms which provide for
ample space to make restitution or reparation orders incident to commitments.
§ 15A-1022. Advising defendant of consequences of guilty plea; informed choice;
factual basis for plea; admission of guilt not required.(a) Except in the case of corporations or in misdemeanor cases in which there is a
waiver of appearance under G.S. 15A-01 l(a)(3), a superior court judge may not accept
a plea of guilty or no contest from the defendant without first addressing him personally
and:
(I) Informing him that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used against him;
(2) Determining that he understands the nature of the charge;
(3) Informing him that he has a right to plead not guilty;
(4) Informing him that by his plea he waives his right to trial by jury and his right
to be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(5) Determining that the defendant, if represented by counsel, is satisfied with his
representation; and
(6) Informing him of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including that
possible from consecutive sentences, and of the mandatory sentence, if any, on
the charge.
(b) By inquiring of the prosecutor and defense counsel and the defendant personally, the judge must determine whether there were any prior plea discussions, whether
the parties have entered into any arrangement with respect to the plea and the terms
thereof, and whether any improper pressure was exerted in violation of G.S. 15A1021(b). The judge may not accept a plea of guilty or no contest from a defendant
without first determining that the plea is a product of informed choice.
(c) The judge may not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea. This determination may be based upon
information including but not limited to:
(1) A statement of the facts by the prosecutor.
(2) A written statement of the defendant.
(3) An examination of the presentence report.
(4) Sworn testimony, which may include reliable hearsay.
(5) A statement of facts by the defense counsel.
(d) The judge may accept the defendant's plea of no contest even though the defendant does not admit that he is in fact guilty if the judge is nevertheless satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea. The judge must advise the defendant that if he
pleads no contest he will be treated as guilty whether or not he admits guilt.
§ 15A-1023. Action by judge in plea arrangement relating to sentence; no approval
required when arrangement does not relate to sentence.(a) If the parties have agreed upon a plea arrangement pursuant to G.S. 15A-1021
in which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence, they must disclose the substance of their agreement to the judge at the time the defendant is called
upon to plead.
(b) Before accepting a plea pursuant to a plea arrangement in which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence, the judge must advise the parties
whether he approves the arrangement and will dispose of the case accordingly. If the
judge rejects the arrangement, he must so inform the parties, refuse to accept the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest, and advise the defendant personally that neither the
State nor the defendant is bound by the rejected arrangement. The judge must advise
the parties of the reasons he rejected the arrangement and afford them an opportunity to
modify the arrangement accordingly. Upon rejection of the plea arrangement by the
judge the defendant is entitled to a continuance until the next session of court. A decision by the judge disapproving a plea arrangement is not subject to appeal.
(c) If the parties have entered a plea arrangement relating to the disposition of
charges in which the prosecutor has not agreed to make any recommendations concerning sentence, the substance of the arrangement must be disclosed to the judge at the time
the defendant is called upon to plead. The judge must accept the plea if he determines
that the plea is the product of the informed choice of the defendant and that there is a
factual basis for the plea.
§ 15A-1024. Withdrawal of guilty plea when sentence not in accord with plea arrangement.-If at the time of sentencing, the judge for any reason determines to impose
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ecution's decision not to bring or to dismiss other charges.' 9 The statute also
authorizes defense counsel to negotiate in an effort to persuade the prosecutor
to recommend or not to oppose a certain sentence. 20 The statute expressly
recognizes that the decision to prosecute or to dismiss one or more charges

belongs
to the prosecutor, whereas the sentencing decision is a judicial function. 21
a sentence other than provided for in a plea arrangement between the parties, the judge
must inform the defendant of the fact and inform the defendant that he may withdraw
his plea. Upon withdrawal, the defendant is entitled to a continuance until the next

session of court.
§ 15A-1026. Record of Proceedings.-A verbatim record of the proceedings at
which the defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest and of any preliminary consideration of a plea arrangement by the judge pursuant to G.S. 15A-1021(c) must be made
and preserved. This record must include the judge's advice to the defendant, and his
inquiries of the defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor and any responses. If the
plea arrangement has been reduced to writing, it must be made a part of the record;
otherwise the judge must require that the terms of the arrangement be stated for the
record and that the assent of the defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor be recorded.
Although these provisions closely follow the drafts of the 1972 and 1975 ALI Codes, there are
several significant divergences: (1) ALl CODE § 350.3(3), reflected in § 15A-1021(b), attempted to
spell out types of "undue pressure," but the Criminal Code Commission decided, according to its
Official Commentary, that any specific definition might restrict the meaning of the phrase, and
also might suggest that such pressures had been widely engaged in previously. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1021(b), Official Commentary. The Commission did, however, direct that ALI CODE
§ 350.3(3) be quoted in the Official Commentary. Id (2) The Commission preferred the term
"plea arrangement" to the ALI "plea agreement" to avoid any implication that the negotiations
were binding. Id -1021(c), Official Commentary. (3) G.S. § 15A-1024 did not adopt that part of
ALI CODE § 350.6 requiring the court to determine from the defendant whether the sentence
pronounced violated any understanding the defendant had concerning his sentence, so that the
defendant's acquiescence in the sentence would appear in the record. Id -1024, Official Commentary. Also, § 350.6 required that the defendant be given an opportunity to withdraw his plea if the
judge pronounced a sentence more severe than that provided for in the plea agreement; § 15A1024 allows withdrawal if the sentence pronounced differs at all from the plea arrangement. Id
The legislature thus sought to avoid judicial weighing of the severity of short incarceration versus
long probation. See id (4) G.S. §§ 15A-1023 to 1024 allow for a continuance until the next session
of court if the plea arrangement is rejected or if the plea is withdrawn; the ALI CODE § 350 does
not contain continuance provisions. See note 33 Mnfra.

19. Id § 1021(a).
20. Id
21. The Official Commentary to § 15A-1021 states:
The final word on sentencing must come from the judge; the [Criminal Code] Commission (unlike the A.L.I. proposal) gave the final decision as to charge reduction or
dismissal to the prosecutor. The judge cannot veto that. Therefore, it is significant that
subsection (c) refers to "a proposed plea arrangement inwhich the solicitor has agreed to
recommend a particular sentence.
15A -1021(c), Official Commentary.
The distinction between prosecutorial control of charge reductions and dismissals and judicial control of sentencing is less meaningful than might at first appear. Charge and sentence
concessions are opposite sides of the same coin; in both the major concern is the length of the
defendant's sentence. A prosecutor who reduces or dismisses charges unilaterally influences
sentences by restricting judicial sentencing options:
From the defendant's perspective, the primary significance of the charge-reduction
process plainly lies in its effect on the sentence that he will receive. The basic commodity
that prosecutors offer defendants in exchange for their pleas remains the same in a system of charge-reduction bargaining as in a system of sentence-recommendation bargaining. In apparent recognition of this fact and in an apparent attempt to prevent
prosecutorial circumvention of the trial judge's sentencing authority, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure require judicial approval of prosecutorial charge-reduction agreements.
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The North Carolina statute departs from the ALI standards in expressly
allowing judicial participation in plea discussions. Although the Criminal
Code Commission recommended that the trial judge not be permitted to participate in plea discussions, the word "not" was deleted from the legislation in
1975, as a result of an amendment introduced by State Senator Thomas H.
Suddarth. When I interviewed Senator Suddarth concerning the reason for

his amendment, he said that he was "horrified" at the thought of banning
judicial participation, because in his experience involvement of the judge was
essential for "the expeditious handling of criminal cases."' 22 He explained that
a judge should be permitted to call the parties together before a trial to inquire
"where they are in their negotiations," and then to assist the prosecutor and

defense lawyer in reaching a settlement.2 3 To forbid a judge from engaging in
view, would be to eliminate a useful
such conduct, in Senator Suddarth's
24
means of resolving criminal cases.

Because only the word "not" was deleted from section 15A-1021(a) and
no changes were made in related provisions of the bill, the statute, taken as a
whole, is unclear and incomplete. Perhaps most importantly, no standards of
any kind are provided to govern judicial participation in plea negotiations.
The statute indicates neither when nor in what manner the trial judge may
participate.2 5 The crucial question respecting the degree of pressure, if any,
that a judge may use in seeking to convince a defendant to plead guilty is not
addressed.2 6 Moreover, section 15A-1021(b) provides that "[n]o person representing the state. . . may bring improper pressure upon a defendant to induce
a plea of guilty or no contest" 27 -a provision apparently intended to discourage any such conduct by police or prosecution. Because the trial judge may
Alschuler, Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1074 (footnotes omitted).
Prosecutorial control over sentencing may become greater in the future in light of the trend in
many jurisdictions to enact determinate sentencing laws that narrow sentence ranges for offenses.
These laws reduce judicial sentencing discretion and relegate to prosecutors increased power to
dictate sentences by selecting the charge. See Miller, supra note 1, at ch. VI-37; notes 140-44 and
accompanying text infra.
FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(e)(l)-(2) allows the judge to reject a plea agreement involving the dismissal or reduction of charges. URCP, supra note 7, RULE 443 also prescribes judicial approval of
charge concessions. The ABA has not taken a position on whether courts should have authority to
approve charge concessions by a prosecutor. ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, STANDARDS
14-1.1, 14-3(b)(ii) Commentary. Some states, such as California; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1192.1, .4,
.5, 1385 (West Supp. 1979); Colorado, COLO. RaV. STAT. § 16-7-302 (1973); Minnesota, MINN. R.
CRIM. P. § 15.07 (1974); New York, N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 220.10(3)-(4) (McKinney Supp.
1980); and Virginia, VA. CODE § 19.2-254 (Supp. 1980), permit courts to reject charge concessions.
Requiring judicial approval may be meaningless, however, if judges readily and invariably approve prosecutorial charge concessions because they fear that rejection of prosecution recommendations will undermine the plea bargaining system. See Alschuler, Judge's Role, supra note 2, at
1138.
22. Interview with State Senator Thomas H. Suddarth, in Lexington, N.C. (Aug. 2, 1976).
23. Id
24. Id
25. The need for standards to guide judicial participation in plea negotiations is discussed at
notes 110-22 and accompanying text infra.
26. The legality of a judge using pressure to induce a defendant to plead guilty is discussed at
notes 71-91 and accompanying text infra.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(b) (1978).
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participate in plea discussions pursuant to section 15A-1021(a) and a judge is
not normally regarded as "representing" the state, section 15A-1021(b) is deficient in not expressly listing the judge. Surely the legislature did not intend to
imply that the trial judge, unlike police and prosecution, may bring "improper
pressure" upon a defendant to induce a plea. The wording of section 15A1021(b) is obviously the by-product of changing one part of a statute without
simultaneously amending its other provisions.
Plea discussions between the judge, prosecution, and defense contemplated by section 15A-1021(a) apparently are permissible any time-prior to
or during recess of a trial or just before entry of a plea of guilty or no contest.
In addition, section 15A-1021(c), which is applicable "in advance of the time
for the tender of the plea," states that if "the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence, . . [the parties] may, with the permission of the
trial judge, advise the trial judge of the terms" of the plea agreement; then
"[tihe trial judge may indicate whether he will concur in the proposed disposition."' 28 Of course, the trial judge may do much more than simply indicate
acceptance or rejection; the judge may, pursuant to section 15A-1021(a), participate in the actual plea discussions with the parties. As a result of the Suddarth amendment, the language of subsection (c) became unnecessary, as a
judge who can participate in plea discussions can necessarily engage in any
lesser form of participation, such as permitting disclosure of a recommended
sentence upon which the parties have agreed. Section 15A-1021(c) was proposed by the Criminal Code Commission, which believed that the trial judge
would be precluded from participating in plea discussions. Its purpose was to
29
limit the judge to simply saying "yes" or "no" to proposed plea agreements.
Regardless of whether the trial court has participated in plea discussions
as permitted by section 15A-1021(a), and regardless of whether the trial court
has been asked to state whether it agrees or disagrees with a proposed sentence
recommendation, as authorized by section 15A-1021(c), when a plea is tendered the parties must advise the court-pursuant to section 15A-1023(a)--of
any sentence that the prosecutor has agreed to recommend. In addition, under
section ISA-1023(b), if the court is advised of "a plea arrangement in which
the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence, the judge must
advise the parties whether he approves the arrangement and will dispose of the
case accordingly."' 30 If the judge rejects the "arrangement," the parties must
be so advised and an opportunity afforded to them to modify the arrangement. 3 1 Also, when a plea arrangement is rejected, the defendant is entitled to
a continuance of the case "until the next session of court."132 Similarly, in
accordance with section 15A-1024, "[i]f at the time of sentencing" the court
determines that it cannot abide by the "plea arrangement" that it previously
28. Id -1021(c).

29. Id § 15A-1021(c) is similar to provisions contained in the plea negotiation statutes of
most other jurisdictions. See notes 5, 9, & 13 supra.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1023(b) (1978).
31. Id
32. Id
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accepted and thus seeks to impose a different sentence, the judge must inform
of the plea, and grant "a continuthe defendant of this fact, permit withdrawal
' 33
ance until the next session of court."

Section 15A-1026 requires that a verbatim record be made and preserved
of the proceeding at which a defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest. It
also requires a verbatim record "of any preliminary consideration of a plea
arrangement" pursuant to section 15A-1021(c). This requirement, however,
has been construed by the North Carolina Supreme Court to apply only to
situations in which an agreement is actually reached and a plea of guilty entered pursuant to the agreement. 34 There is no requirement that a verbatim
33. Id -1024. The significance of "a continuance until the next session of court" is unclear.
One writer has suggested this provision guarantees that a defendant will not be disadvantaged by
facing the judge before whom a guilty plea was withdrawn. Eagles, Articles 52 and 53 of Subchapter9, andSubchapter 10 ofthe Code oPretrialCriminalProcedure-MotionsPractice,Motions
to Suppress, Pleas, Plea Arrangementsand Immunity, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 517, 533 (1974).
Neither North Carolina statutes nor court decisions, however, appear to define "next session of
court." CorpusJuris Secundum distinguishes "term" and "session": "term" refers to a period of
time for holding court, whereas "session" is a time during a term in which the court actually sits
for the transaction ofjudicial business. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 147 (1940). Thus, a session can refer to
one day of a term or to a shorter time period such as a morning session. Further, state laws differ
markedly in defining terms and sessions. Id § 162. In North Carolina a session seemingly refers
to a period of time scheduled by the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court for court
to be held in a particular county by a particular judge to hear either civil or criminal cases. Superior court judges rotate from district to district (one or more counties), serving a minimum of six
months in each. Because the lengths of court sessions are not defined in North Carolina statutes, it
seems possible that the next session of court may be held by the same judge. (For further information on the judicial district system, see note 37 infra.) The Governor, however, can appoint special
superior court judges to be assigned to any court, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45 (1969 & Supp. 1979),
and the Chief Justice has the discretionary power to order a special session of superior court in
any county. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-46 (1969). Conceivably, these provisions could be employed
to ensure a new judge at the next session of court for any defendant who withdraws a guilty plea.
Apparently the legislature intended the continuance provision to guarantee the defendant a
new judge to hear his or her case without the bias that knowledge of an unsuccessful plea arrangement might entail. Indeed, the provision is meaningless without this result. The 1975 ALl Code,
which is nearly identical to the 1972 ALI Code upon which the North Carolina legislation is
based, see note 18 supra, does not explicitly call for continuances, but the Commentary to § 350.5
indicates that if a judge rejects a plea arrangement, a subsequent trial should be held, if feasible,
before a different judge, to eliminate possible prejudice. See ALl CODE, supra note 7, § 350.5,
Commentary. Other national organizations have addressed whether a defendant should be tried
before a new judge if a plea arrangement is rejected and a pre-plea report has been reviewed by
the rejecting judge. The ABA does not require that a new judge be substituted, and cases in which
judges were not disqualified in analogous situations are favorably cited. See ABA PLEAS OF
GUILTY, supra note 7, at 14.81 n.10. In contrast, the URCP states, "If a plea is not accepted, a
judge who has examined a report. . . may not over the defendant's objection preside at the trial
of the case." URCP, supra note 7, RULE 443(b).
34. State v. Slade, 291 N.C. 275, 229 S.E.2d 921 (1976). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1026 (1978)
clearly seems to require a transcript of any preliminary consideration of a plea arrangement
reached between the prosecution and defense if the judge is consulted pursuant to § 1SA- [021(c).
Nevertheless, the court in Slade ruled that the requirement of a verbatim record being made and
transcribed is "conditioned upon an agreement being reached and a plea of guilty being entered."
291 N.C. at 278, 229 S.E.2d at 924 (emphasis added). The rationale for the court's conclusion lies
in its reasons for requiring a verbatim record,--"to insure that defendant is fully aware of the
ramifications of his plea of guilty," and to provide a record of the terms and conditions utilized by
the prosecutioh to induce the guilty plea. Id Thus, the court implicitly concluded that, because a
rejected plea arrangement is not subject to appeal under § 15A-1023(b), a verbatim record of the
proceedings at which the judge rejected the arrangement would serve no purpose. The court's
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the North Carolina statute does not require a transcript of
plea discussions in which the judge participates pursuant to § 15A-1021(a). As a practical matter,
the Slade ruling has the effect of requiring a verbatim record when a plea arrangement is
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record be made and preserved of plea discussions to which the judge is a party
pursuant to section 15A-1021(a).
III.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

A. Forms of Plea Bargaining

As noted earlier, the North Carolina statute authorizes the parties to ne35
gotiate respecting the offenses to be charged and the defendant's sentence.
During interviews prosecutors and defense attorneys were asked about the
types and frequency of plea agreements that were actually made and whether
there were other kinds of plea agreements in addition to those specifically
sanctioned by statute. Without exception, they agreed that so-called "straight"
pleas of guilty, meaning guilty pleas only to the offense or offenses charged
and without a sentence recommendation or the waiver or dismissal of any
other charges, are relatively infrequent. Estimates of such straight pleas
ranged from five to fifteen percent of all pleas. As one defense attorney explained, a "straight plea" is entered only in the unusual case in which there are
no charges that the prosecutor is willing to dismiss or there is no lesser offense
to which a plea can be offered or that will be accepted by the prosecutor.
The most common type of plea agreement-with the estimates usually
placed at about fifty percent of all pleas-is a plea to a lesser offense or to one
of several charges, with the prosecutor agreeing either to waive or dismiss all
remaining charges. For example, as one prosecutor explained, armed robbery
may be reduced to common-law robbery, or rape may be reduced to assault on
or rape may
a female, or the remainder of multiple charges of armed robbery
36
be dismissed in return for a guilty plea to only one charge.

The next most common form of plea bargaining involves sentence recommendations by the prosecutor, although such recommendations may sometimes be part of a larger plea arrangement in which the prosecutor has agreed
to dismiss certain charges or to accept a plea to a lesser charge. Most of the
prosecutors and public defenders interviewed were specifically asked how
often they are involved in guilty pleas in which a sentence recommendation is
presented to the court. Their replies were substantially consistent. Of the
three prosecutors who were asked, one estimated that sentence recommendations were present in twenty percent of his guilty plea cases, another guessed
presented to the court for its consideration, but then permitting destruction of the record if either
the judge rejects the arrangement or the defendant later decides to plead not guilty. This Article
suggests that a verbatim transcript be made of all plea discussions in which the trial judge participates, regardless of whether a guilty plea is entered. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(a) (1978). See note 18 supra (text of statute).
36. Presently, robbery is a felony in North Carolina carrying a punishment of seven years to

life in a state prison. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (Supp. 1979). Common-law robbery is punishable
by up to ten years' imprisonment. Id §§ 14-87.1, -1.1. Rape in the first degree is punishable by
life imprisonment. Id § 14-27.2. Punishment for second-degree rape is imprisonment for up to

40 years. Id § 14-27.3. The same punishments are provided for first- and second-degree sexual
offenses. Id §§ 14-27.4, .5. Attempt to commit first-degree rape or attempt to commit a firstdegree sexual offense carries a penalty of up to 20 years in prison, and attempted second-degree
rape or second-degree sexual offense is punishable by imprisonment up to 10 years. Id § 14-27.6.
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ten percent, and the third placed the figure at between twenty and twenty-five
percent; of the four public defenders, two estimated twenty-five percent, a
third defender suggested twenty percent, and the fourth defender guessed fifty
percent.
When the attorneys were asked why sentence recommendations were
present in some cases and not in others, the predilection of the trial judge
invariably was mentioned as among the most significant reasons. Although
judges are rotated periodically through each superior court by the state's Administrative Office of the Courts, all of the judges assigned to the division in
which this particular superior court was situated were well known to the prosecutors and defense lawyers. 37 As one public defender observed, after a short
time you get a "line" on each of the judges, and you learn what he or she will
tolerate in terms of plea bargaining practices. A prosecutor, using more colorful language, agreed. Some judges, he said, are the "garbage men" or "crash"
judges who will accept virtually all sentence recommendations placed before
them, thus enabling the district attorney to "move the calendar." This prosecutor's boss, the district attorney, explained that his office arranges the calendar for a court session to accommodate the plea bargaining and sentencing
policies of each judge.38 Thus, if a certain judge is regarded as lenient, and
defense attorneys like to plead their clients before the judge or if the judge is
one who ordinarily will accept the prosecutor's sentence recommendations, the
calendar will contain a large number of cases expected to be disposed of pursuant to plea agreements.
The truth of the district attorney's statements was illustrated in an unexpected way. While I was visiting in the courthouse on a Friday afternoon, the
district attorney's office was suddenly informed by the Administrative Office
of the Courts that Judge A, who had been scheduled to hold court for the next
six months beginning the following Monday, would be unavailable because of
illness in his family. Furthermore, the substitute for Judge A would be Judge
37. North Carolina is divided into 33 judicial districts, which in turn are organized into four
divisions. Each district has been assigned one or more regular resident superior court judge(s).
Id § 7A-41. Each regular judge rotates through all districts in his or her division, sitting for six

months in each. If the district has two judges, each sits for 12 months; if three judges, the rotation
period is 18 months, and so on. In a district (one or more counties) with only one resident judge,
litigants have no choice between judges for six months, unless a special judge is appointed or a
special session of court is called under G.S. §§ 7A-45, -46 (1969 & Supp. 1979). J. BRANNON, THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN NORTH CAROLINA 6 (1977). See note 33 supra.

38. In North Carolina the prosecutor has control over the calendar of criminal cases to be
tried during a session of court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-49.3 (1969); Shirley v. State, 528 F.2d 819,
820 (4th Cir. 1975). The State's speedy trial statute, however, restricts the prosecutor's discretion,
as time limits are provided within which a case must be either brought to trial or dismissed. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-701 to -704 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
Prosecution control of the calendar is criticized in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-5.1 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION]. The ABA recommends court control in order to avoid the appearance of conflict of interest or discriminatory practices by district attorneys. Id Commentary, at 3.70. The
National District Attorneys Association supports dividing calendar control between the court,
which would schedule time periods during which criminal cases would be tried, and the prosecutor, who would determine the order of cases to be tried. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS AssoCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 15.1 (1977).
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B, a judge who did not normally sit in this superior court district, but who was
reputed to be a tough sentencing judge who did not like sentence recommen-

dations. The district attorney's office immediately understood what this
meant. Defense attorneys would object to entering guilty pleas, and it also

would be futile to present sentence recommendations that previously had been
negotiated. Thus, during the following week, of forty-nine defendants whose

cases were on the original calendar of Judge A, twenty-six were expressly continued. Indeed, several continuances even were arranged on Friday afternoon

by defense attorneys who learned of Judge B's substitution for Judge A.
Others were arranged the following week in Judge B's courtroom because, for

example, the defendant was said to be ill or defense counsel had a prior commitment. Still other cases were continued when they were called once in open
court, passed because defense counsel was said to be occupied elsewhere in the
courthouse, and then never called again. 39 Privately, the prosecutors and de-

fense lawyers conceded to me that the large number of continuances was
caused by the unavailability of Judge A to accept the agreements previously
negotiated. Indeed, the desire of defense lawyers to continue cases received

fresh, if superfluous, impetus when early in the week a defendant sentenced
for armed robbery before Judge B received forty years-a sentence that was

regarded by defense lawyers as considerably greater than what Judge A would
have given.

40

Interviews with superior court judges also confirmed substantial attitudinal differences among judges concerning their readiness to accept sentencing

recommendations. Judge C, for example, told me that he was "violently opposed to the solicitor and defense attorney passing sentence," and that he

"doesn't want to be a rubber-stamp." In his judgment, the court should impose sentence, but he expressed concern that "the solicitor now feels like he
can run the whole damn court." In contrast, Judge D explained that he had
faith in the district attorney and in his conclusions about cases, and that the

district attorney usually understood how the police felt about the cases and
knew more of the defendant's background than did the judge. Not surprisingly, Judge D stated, "I do go along with the vast majority of recommenda39. GEN. RULES OF PRAC. FOR THE SUPER. & DisT. COURTS 3 provides: "An application for
a continuance shall be made to the presiding judge of the court in which the case is calendared."
The third paragraph of rule 3 refers to "criminal cases," stating that where the defendant is in jail
the case shall have "absolute priority." Rule I states that the rules "are applicable in Superior
• . . Court...," without specifying either criminal or civil cases. In civil cases, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ IA-I, Rule 40 (1969) provides that continuances will be granted only upon application to the
court and only for good cause shown. The only other specific references to continuances in criminal cases apparently are contained in G.S. § 15-10.2 (1978) (court may grant any "necessary and
reasonable continuance" requested by the defense in cases involving incarcerated persons against
whom detainers have been lodged), and G.S. § 15A-701(b)(7) (Supp. 1979) (factors for judges to
consider in granting continuances under the Speedy Trial Act).
Some of the representations made by counsel to obtain continuances may have been misleading or even false. Consider in this connection ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR
7-102(A)(5) (1979), which states that "a lawyer shall not [kinowingly make a false statement of law
or fact."
40. See note 36 supra.
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tions," and that, as a practical matter, "the district attorney sentences in a lot
of instances."
Because prosecutors and defense attorneys believed that some judges
were receptive to sentence recommendations whereas others were not, and because the judges themselves expressed differing attitudes on the subject, I hypothesized that widely differing estimates would be given if all superior court
judges were asked to state the percentage of cases in which they received sentence recommendations. Accordingly, the first item on the questionnaire sent
to the state's superior court judges asked that they indicate the percentage of
cases in which they were presented with prosecution and defense agreements
relating to sentence. The pattern of judicial responses presented below substantiates my hypothesis.
Table I
in
Which Judge Is Presented with
of
Cases
Percentage
to Defendant's Proposed
Relating
Agreements
Sentence
Percentage
Percentage of
No. of Judges
Estimates
Judges Responding
Responding
0%
7.5
3
1%- 10%
20
8
ll%-20%
20
8
21% - 30%
7.5
3
31%-40%
2.5
1
41%- 50%
7.5
3
51%-60%
17.5
7
61%-70%
5
2
71% - 80%
12.5
5
81% -90%
0
91% -99%
0
100%
-0
100%
40
Thus, three judges (7.5 percent) claimed that they never receive a sentence
recommendation, and eight judges (20 percent) said that such recommendations were present in no more than 10 percent of their cases. On the other
hand, fourteen judges, 35 percent of those who responded, acknowledged that
sentence recommendations were presented to them in 51 percent of more of
their cases.
In addition to plea arrangements respecting charges and the defendant's
sentence, the North Carolina legislation also specifically refers to plea agree-
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ments involving "restitution or reparation." 4 ' Thus, the statute provides for a
number of plea negotiation possibilities. Nevertheless, there are also plea
agreements between prosecutors and defense lawyers that are not explicitly
sanctioned by statute. For example, if the trial judge is one who commonly
will accept a plea of no contest, the prosecutor and defense lawyer may negotiate over whether to allow such a plea to be enered. 42 One day I observed a
private defense lawyer in court with four of his clients, all of whom entered
pleas of no contest before Judge A, who was known to be receptive to such
pleas. In one of the cases, the defendant was charged with possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana). The only agreement with the prosecutor
was that a no contest plea would be entered. The defendant was placed on
probation for two years and the defense attorney, whom I previously had interviewed, whispered to me as he was leaving the courtroom, that "before
some other judges there would have had to have been more of a bargain than
a no contest plea because of the risk of a stiff sentence."
Prosecutors and defense attorneys also negotiate about the judge before
whom a defendant will plead, and whether sentencing should be continued in
order that the defendant may be sentenced before a different judge than the
one before whom the plea was entered. 43 For instance, the case of a defendant
charged with rape was on Judge C's calendar on the same day that Judge A
was holding court down the hall. Initially, the defendant and defense attorney
were in Judge C's courtroom. The case was called and passed, to afford time
for negotiations. Ultimately, the parties agreed that the defendant would be
permitted to plead guilty before Judge A; moments later the defense attorney
and defendant appeared in Judge A's courtroom, defendant's name was
called, and Judge A was told that "this" was an "add-on case." A guilty plea
to second degree rape then was entered. In another case, a prosecutor agreed
to calendar a case before Judge A in return for defendant's agreement to plead
to armed robbery. Remarkably, this defendant originally had been scheduled
to plead guilty to common-law robbery before Judge A; however, when Judge
A became unavailable and Judge B was substituted, the prosecutor agreed to a
continuance until the following week only on condition that defendant plead
to armed robbery before Judge A. The defense attorney, a public defender,
told me that he felt his client would fare better with a plea to armed robbery
44
before Judge A than with a plea to common-law robbery before Judge B.
The identity of the prosecutor assigned to the defendant's case also may
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(d) (Supp. 1979). See note 18 supra (text of statute).
42. Id § 15A-1011(b) provides that "[a] defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the prosecutor and the presiding judge." Because prosecution approval is required, negotiations concerning entry of no contest pleas are virtually inevitable. North Carolina statutes on
plea negotiations, however, do not refer to plea arrangements involving no contest pleas. See note

18 supra (text of statutes).
43. The extent of negotiations concerning choice ofjudges undoubtedly is determined by the
number of judges resident in the district, and also by the expiration date of a judge's term. The
rotation of superior court judges to districts and the length of their terms are discussed in note 37
supra.

44. See note 36 supra (penalties upon convictions for armed robbery and common-law robbery).
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have an important bearing on plea bargaining practices. The district attorney
and his assistants explained that there were no written plea negotiation guidelines and that all assistants had complete authority to negotiate agreements
without obtaining prior approval from anyone. The assistant district attorneys
reported, however, that there were certain norms to which as a group they
sought to adhere, and that occasionally they consulted with the district attorney concerning a proposed agreement. Nevertheless, because of the broad discretion accorded to them, the prosecutors were free, by their own admission, to
let their personal attitudes toward defense lawyers influence the plea agreements that they made. 45 Thus, one prosecutor stated that the "personalities"
of the defense lawyers sometimes made a considerable difference, as prosecutors react differently to different defense lawyers. Another prosecutor was
more blunt; according to this three-year veteran, there are "some defense lawyers I like and I give them a break," whereas there are "a few I do not like and
I won't bargain with them." Significantly, some defense attorneys believed
that the clients of certain attorneys received more favorable plea bargains than
others. According to an assistant public defender who felt that he personally
did not always obtain satisfactory plea agreements, the best deals were given
by prosecutors to the private defense lawyers most well known in the criminal
bar-the "powerful attorneys." According to one of the private attorneys who
the assistant public defender regarded as "powerful," prosecutors made good
deals with him because there is "a strong inclination to go along with people
you get along with."
B. Recommended andAgreed upon Sentences
As noted in the preceding section, sentence recommendations by prosecutors are a relatively frequent type of plea agreement, but such recommendations actually take at least two distinct forms. Prosecutors and defense
attorneys unanimously reported that some judges distinguish between situations in which the prosecutor "recommends" a sentence and pleas that are said
to be "agreed upon" or "conditioned." For the former, the transcript of plea
form, which is signed by the prosecutor, defendant, defense counsel, and
judge, states that the prosecutor "recommends that the defendant receive" a
45. Prosecutors are reluctant either to define or limit the broad discretion available to them in
plea negotiations. Bond, supra note 16, at 833. Several national organizations, however, have
called for regulations to guide such discretion. The ABA recommends that each public prosecutor
develop a handbook of policies and procedures to guide prosecutorial participation in plea negotiations. ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 38, Standard 3-2.5. Similarly, the NAC recommends formulation of guiding statements and also suggests certain criteria. NAC COURTS, supra

note 2, Standard 3.3. These NAC recommendations are one of several stop-gap measures endorsed to govern plea bargaining during an interim period before the practice can be eliminated.
See note 3 supra. The ALI directs each prosecutor to promulgate procedures pertaining to plea
discussions and agreements, in order to encourage equal treatment of similarly situated defendants. ALI CODE, supra note 7, § 350.3(2). These organizations commonly cite written guidelines
as a means of maintaining consistent practices and continuity in the face of staff turnover.
In 1980, for the first time in its history, the United States Department of Justice issued a
document containing prosecution policies, including the subject of plea negotiations, for use by
U.S. Attorneys throughout the country. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECtmON, reportedin 27 CRIM. L. RPTR. 3277 (August 6, 1980).
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specified sentence; in the latter instance, the plea form recites either "the defendant will receive" or "it is agreed that the defendant will receive" a specified sentence. 46 Judges who distinguish between thse two forms of plea
agreements do not regard a "recommended sentence" as binding; if after the

plea is accepted a different sentence is imposed, defendant's plea cannot be
withdrawn. On the other hand, if defendant's plea entered in return for an
"agreed upon sentence" is rejected by the court, these judges believe that defendant must be afforded the opportunity to withdraw the plea. 47 Virtually all

of the prosecutors, public defenders, and private defense attorneys interviewed
stated that they had observed cases in which the trial court rejected "recommended sentences" and imposed harsher sentences, but denied defendant's re-

quest to withdraw the plea.
The four judges who were interviewed disagreed about whether they

should give different treatment to "recommended" and "agreed upon"
sentences. Judge A stated that he always permits withdrawl of the plea if the

negotiated sentence is rejected, regardless of the precise language in the transcript of plea form. Judge D, who was the only one of the four judges who

stated that he thought the matter was controlled by the state's plea bargaining
statute, claimed to follow a similar policy. In contrast, Judge B stated that a

prosecutor's "recommended sentence" is only a recommendation; if it is rejected by the court at the time of sentencing, the plea cannot be withdrawn.
An "agreed upon" sentence is different, according to Judge B; the plea is actually conditioned upon defendant's receiving the specified sentence, and if a

different sentence is imposed, defendant must be permitted to withdraw the
plea. Judge C expressed a similar viewpoint, but added that as a matter of
46. The transcript of plea form was drafted by the Administrative Office of the Courts of the
North Carolina Department of Justice in response to requests by superior court judges for assistance in complying with statutory requirements for the entry of pleas of guilty or no contest. The
form essentially tracks the requirements of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A (1978), particularly § 15A1022. See note 18 supra. Although the form is not required to be used, the Administrative Office
of the Courts reports that it is widely used by judges throughout the state. Telephone interview
with Dallas A. Cameron, Jr., Assistant Director for Legal Services, Administrative Office of the
Courts, Raleigh, North Carolina (August 11, 1980).
Particularly pertinent to this Article are questions 11 and 12 of the plea transcript form:
11. Have you agreed to plead as a part of a plea bargain? Before you answer, I advise
you that the courts have approved plea bargaining and if there is one, you may
advise me truthfully without fear ofincurring my disapproval. Answer _
12. [If applicable] The District Attorney and your counsel have informed the Court
that these are all the terms and conditions of your plea:
(a) Is this correct? Answer
(b) Do you accept this arrangement? Answer
The differential wording is inserted in the blank spaces of question 12, which usually are filled in
by defense counsel prior to the hearing.
47. Suppose prosecution and defense have reached a plea arrangement, but the prosecution
withdraws approval of the agreement prior to entry of the plea. According to State v. Collins, 300
N.C. 142, 265 S.E.2d 172 (1980), unless defendant has relied detrimentally upon the plea arrangement, the prosecution is not obligated to honor the agreement. Id at 148, 26 S.E.2d at 176. There
is no discussion in Collins of "agreed upon" or "recommended" sentences, although the plea
agreement quoted in the decision is in the "agreed upon" form. See id at 148, 265 S.E.2d at 175.
Contra, United States v. Cooper, 594 F.2d 12, 19 (4th Cir. 1979).
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practice he does not deny withdrawal of a "recommended sentence" plea unless "I've made it absolutely clear [when the plea is accepted] that this [bargained sentence recommendation] is only a recommendation."
The questionnaire sent to the superior court judges asked whether they
"believe there is a difference in plea bargains where the solicitor 'recommends'
a sentence as opposed to plea bargains where the defense attorney and solicitor state that the sentence is 'agreed upon' or that a plea is 'conditioned upon'
the defendant receiving the proposed sentence." Of the forty judges who responded to this question, twenty-seven (sixty-seven percent) stated that there
was a difference and thirteen (thirty-three percent) claimed there was not. The
explanatory statements solicited from the judges concerning this question mirrored the diverse views received earlier from Judges A, B, C, and D. For
instance, one judge wrote that "[a] recommended sentence leaves the court the
discretion to modify the sentence. An agreed upon sentence takes away discretion in sentencing. I won't take a plea where the plea is conditioned upon
such and such a sentence."
The confusion that exists respecting "recommended" sentences is difficult
to understand because the North Carolina statute on the subject is unambiguous. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1024 provides that "[i]f at the time of sentencing,
the judge for any reason determines to impose a sentence other than provided
for in a plea arrangement between the parties, the judge must inform the defendant of that fact and inform the defendant that he may withdraw his
plea."'48 A "plea arrangement," according to other provisions of the statute,
refers to the "prosecutor. ..[having] agreed to recommend a particular sentence." 49 Hence, it seems clear from the face of the statute that a defendant
who has had a "recommended sentence" rejected by a judge must be afforded
the opportunity to withdraw his or her plea.
The statute makes no allowance for the "agreed upon" or "conditioned"
plea. Plea arrangements are referred to in the statute only as agreements "in
which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence." 50 All
judges, however, seem to grant the statutory right of withdrawal when the plea
is in the "agreed upon" or "conditioned" form. Therefore, the primary importance of this wording seems to be to make the "recommended" sentence wording mean something less, thereby, as to the latter, encouraging judges to
deviate from the plain wording of the statute.
Unlike the North Carolina statute, other codes do not authorize withdrawal of a plea when the prosecutor "recommends" a sentence pursuant to a
plea agreement that is then rejected by the court. The ABA's 1980 revision of
its Pleas of Guilty standards provides that if the trial court does not agree with
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1024 (1978). See note 18 supra (text of statute).
49. Id §§ 15A-1021(c), -1023(b). The only other section of the statute that uses this phrase is
§ 15A-1023(c), which refers to "a plea arrangement relating to the disposition of charges m which
the prosecutor has not agreed to make any recommendations concerning sentence." No provision
of the statute refers to an "agreed upon" sentence. For the full text of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A1021 to -1024, 1026, see note 18 supra.
50. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.

PLEA BARGAINING

19811

a proposed sentence concession, withdrawal of the plea is permissible only if
"prior to the entry of the plea the judge concurs, whether tentatively or fully,
in the proposed. . . sentence concessions; or the guilty plea is entered upon
the express condition, approved by the judge, that the plea can be withdrawn
51
if the ...sentence concessions are subsequently rejected by the court."
Similarly, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that when a plea
agreement between the parties involves a sentence recommendation, plea
withdrawal is not permissible if a different sentence is imposed, so long as "the
court shall advise the defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation
or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw his
52
plea."
The wisdom of the approach of the ABA standards and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure is open to serious question. Undoubtedly, these rules
appeal to lawyers, as the rules are clear and logical. After all, if a judge
promises a sentence in return for a guilty plea and the sentence is not received,
defendant's plea, in fairness, should be permitted to be withdrawn. On the
other hand, if thre is only a sentence recommendation that is rejected by the
court, why should the defendant be permitted to withdraw his or her plea?
Perhaps, however, strict logic ought not be so rigorously applied to persons
faced with the stress of pleading guilty, particularly as felony defendants typically expect judicial approval of prosecution sentence recommendations. The
first edition of ABA Pleas of Guilty standards adopted the position that whenever the sentence imposed differs from that contemplated by the parties in a
plea agreement, the defendant's plea can be withdrawn. 53 The commentary to
these standards explained:
[I]f the trial judge later changes his mind, he must inform the defendant of this fact and provide the defendant with an opportunity to
withdraw his plea. .

.

. [E]ven though the prior concurrence of the

trial judge was conditional, so that strictly speaking his later decision
on final disposition is not contradictory, it nonetheless seems fair to
give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea. If the judge
were not to give the defendant this chance, but instead held the defendant to hisplea andrefused to grantthe concessions contemplatedin the
plea agreement,the defendant wouldprobablybelieve that he had been

dealt with unfairly. There are obvious reasons, from a correctional
that he was treated
standpoint, why a defendant whould be satisfied
54
fairly when he arrives at the penitentiary.
The current North Carolina statute adheres to this approach, although the
51. ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-3.3(g). The ABA commentary explains that because a plea arrangement is discharged when the prosecutor makes the recommendation, there normally is no justification for allowing withdrawal of a plea if the judge does not
follow the recommendation, unless the judge expressly or implicitly concurs in the recommendation and defendant, relying upon the representations of the judge, agrees to plead guilty. Id
Commentary, at 14.88.
52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2).

53. ABA

PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS

OF GUILTY, Standard 3.3(b) (1968).
54. Id at 2 (emphasis added).
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neither understood nor followed by all of the state's supestatute is apparently
55
rior court judges.
C. JudicialParticipationand DifferentialSentencing

1. Practices
There is considerable evidence nationwide that defendants are induced to
plead guilty because they expect lighter sentences than if they are tried and
convicted, particularly if conviction follows a jury trial.5 6 Indeed, it is usually
argued that without the expectation of a more favorable sentence following a
guilty plea, a system of plea bargaining and widespread guilty pleas would
57
collapse because there would be no incentive for defendants to forego trials.
55. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1024 (1978).
56. The expectation of lighter sentences in return for pleading guilty commonly is termed
"implicit bargaining":
The mere availability of the guilty plea can be irresistible inducement for defendants to waive the right to contest charges against them. The President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice has reported: "Even where there have
been no explicit negotiations, defendants relying on prevailing practices often act on the
justifiable assumption that those who plead guilty will be- sentenced more leniently." It
can be argued that every defendant who pleads guilty has entered into an implicit bargain in the form of a reasonable expectation ofsentencing leniency. The quid pro quo of
the bargain is no less substantial because it is unspoken.

Commentary, 22 ALA. L. REv. 76, 86 (1969) (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
[One] faction is unconvinced that leniency is granted in return for pleas of guilty,
arguing rather, that what really happens is that defendants are threatened with more
severe sentences should they be convicted at trial. Scholars have expressed the fear that
innocent defendants may be encouraged to plead guilty by the inducement of lighter
sentences.
Miller, supra note 1, at ch. VI-1-2 (footnotes omitted).
Defendants are understandably extremely interested in knowing precisely the sentence they
will receive. Alschuler, Judge'sRole, supra note 2, at 1140. Accordingly, defendants are almost
surely more comfortable with a system of explicit plea negotiations in which sentences can be
ascertained with certainty. In implicit bargaining, the expected sentence differential must be
greater in order to induce a guilty plea than would be required if the bargaining occurred openly.
Id at 1080. In a few jurisdictions, such as Alaska, efforts have been made to abolish plea bargaining; in actuality, of course, only explicit bargaining has been banned, thus escalating the importance of implicit bargaining. See Miller, supra note 1, at ch. 1-31.
57. "A defendant told only that his sentence would probably be the same after a conviction
by trial as after a conviction by plea and that neither sentence could be known in advance would
sense very little incentive to plead guilty." Alschuler, Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1082. See
Note, Restructuringthe Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972). Miller's study also supports this
view:
The findings of this study and of studies made of the attempts to eliminate plea
bargaining in New York and Alaska indicate that most defendants want some measure
of certainty that they will receive a more lenient sentence before they will agree to plead
guilty. . . . Where there is certainty that differential sentences between plea and trial
will be minimal, more defendants opt for trial and backlogs occur.
The judges and prosecutors whom we interviewed believe that incentives are necessary to induce guilty pleas.
Miller, supra note 1, at ch. VI-33 (footnotes omitted). See generally id at ch. VI.
But see M. RUBENSTEIN, S. CLARKE, & T. WHITE, supra note 3; Rubenstein & White, Alaska
Bans Plea-Bargaining,in PLEA BARGAINING 51 (W. McDonald & J. Cramer eds. 1980): "[Tlhe
rates of guilty pleas, pleas to reduced charges, and dismissals changed very little [after Alaska
banned plea bargaining], suggesting that some of the previously held beliefs about the causal
associations of plea-bargaining with these phenomena need reexamination." It was found that
court processes accelerated rather than bogged down; that trial rates increased substantially but
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In my interviews with prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, I asked
about the prevalence of "differential sentencing"-the practice of sentencing

differently those who plead guilty compared to those who exercise their right
to trial. Without exception, prosecutors and defense lawyers stated that differ-

ential sentencing was a well-recognized fact of life in the state's criminal justice system. The four judges who were interviewed, however, were less willing
to acknowledge the practice of differential sentencing. Only Judge A readily
conceded that he routinely gave lighter sentences to those who pleaded guilty

and harsher sentences to those who were tried and convicted. As Judge A
explained, it is "just human nature to look more favorably on a defendant who
admits his guilt." At the other extreme, Judges B and D stated that they were

determined not to sentence any differently defendants who pleaded guilty
compared to those who were convicted following a jury trial. Somewhere between the comments of these three judges were those of Judge C, who said that
he tried not to be more lenient with defendants who plead guilty, but he be-

lieved that "subconsciously" he may sometimes react negatively against defendants who are tried and convicted, and sentence them more severely.

Moreover, Judge C said that if a defendant takes the witness stand and lies,
the lying "compounds the problem" for the defendant, who will almost certainly be sentenced more harshly.58
The questionnaire sent to the state's superior court judges asked whether

they "sentence defendants who plead guilty less harshly than defendants who
go to trial." Their responses are presented in Table II:
were still relatively small; and that conviction rates did not change significantly overall, with conviction and sentencing involving crimes of violence changing not at all. Id at 28.
[M]ost guilty pleas and dismissals were entered because the parties simply did not
perceive any better alternatives. With or without "insurance" or "concessions," most
defendants and counsel apparently believe that, when their charges were not dismissed,
pleading guilty was their best recourse. There was little desire to insist on a trial that was
,
to result in conviction.
most likely
RuBENSTEIN, CLARKE & WHITE, supra, at 223.
58. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), upheld the discretionary right of a judge to consider the falsity of a defendant's testimony at trial in
imposing sentence. Id at 55. The Court reasoned that the defendant's demeanor under oath is
probative of his personality and prospects for rehabilitation, and is therefore a relevant factor in
sentencing. Id at 50.
In dissenting, Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out that there had been no determination of defendant's mendacity, and that every defendant who chooses to testify risks the possibility of punishment due to the trial judge's perception of his testimony; thus, defendant's right to testify was
burdened, and the burden was not outweighed by the additional contribution to the judge's basis
for rendering a sentence. Id at 55-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Table II
Frequency of Less Harsh Sentences for Defendants
Who Plead Guilty

Always
Almost Always
Sometimes
Rarely
"Never

No. of Judges
Responding
0
8
21
3
7
39

% of Judges
Responding
20.6%
53.8%
7.7%
17.9%
100 %

The data contained in the foregoing table strongly suggest that the prosecutors and defense lawyers interviewed were accurate in their perception that
differential sentencing of defendants is common among the state's superior
court judges. Twenty-nine of the thirty-nine responding judges (75%) acknowledged that differential sentencing was practiced "almost always" or
"sometimes," whereas only seven judges (18%) claimed that they never gave
lighter sentences to defendants who pleaded guilty.
Furthermore, even the responses of the judges who denied differential
sentencing practices should be interpreted in light of the interview statements
of Judges B and D. While both of these judges categorically denied giving
lighter sentences to defendants simply because they plead guilty, certain of
their other statements cast doubt upon these denials. Significantly, both said
that during the trial of a case they sometimes seek to encourage a guilty plea
by suggesting to the defendant that a lighter sentence will be imposed than if
conviction follows a jury verdict. Although Judge B said that he was disinclined to mention the specific sentence for fear of putting the defendant under
"duress," Judge D stated that he had sometimes during a trial promised a
defendant probation in return for a guilty plea.
Indeed, from my interviews with prosecutors, defense lawyers, and
judges, it seems clear that some trial judges seek to induce guilty pleas either
just before the beginning of jury trials or while they are actually underway.
The promise of differential sentencing, of course, is the technique used to convince the defendant to forego a pending jury trial. For example, a public defender told of a case in which his client was charged with assault with intent to
commit rape.5 9 During the midst of trial, the judge suddenly called the defense attorney and prosecutor to the bench and, off-the-record, told the attorney that if defendant would plead guilty, thereby aborting the trial, the
sentence would not exceed ten years. The judge continued, however, that if
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-22, which was then in effect, imposed punishment of one to fifteen
years. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-22 (1969) (repealed 1979). This charge now falls under N.C. GEN.
STAT.

§ 14-27.6 (Supp. 1979), proscribing attempts to commit first- or second-degree rape, which

carry a penalty of up to 20 years and up to 10 years, respectively.
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defendant rejected this offer and was convicted by the jury, the sentence would
be the then fifteen year maximum. During a recess the public defender relayed this message to his client; the client promptly pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to ten years.
Normally, the pressure applied by judges to induce guilty pleas is more
subtle than that applied in the foregoing example. A private defense attorney
told me that in his cases, when plea discussions were initiated during trials, the
judge would usually say something like, "isn't there some way this can be
worked out," or "this is a serious case, and if that boy is convicted I'll have to
give him an active sentence." Similarly, a public defender (not the one who
told me of the rape case related above) said that he had tried cases in which
judges called the lawyers up to the bench and said, "can't you all settle this
case?" According to this defender, ordinarily sentences were not mentioned,
but the implication was clear that if the trial were completed and the defendant convicted, the sentence would be greater than if a plea were entered immediately.
Judge C also referred to the implications when a judge discusses a possible guilty plea with the lawyers while a trial is in progress. For instance, Judge
C said that when an obviously guilty defendant insists on an "uncomfortable
trial," the threat of a harsher sentence upon conviction by a jury "would be
implied if not said outright." Judge C also said that he does sometimes "pressure" the parties during a trial to come to a settlement, usually in cases in
which he feels the defendant deserves a light sentence that will be more difficult to justify following conviction by a jury.
Several prosecutors complained that the judicial practice of seeking to
induce guilty pleas during trials sometimes "coerced" them into accepting
pleas to lesser offenses to which they were opposed. The most vivid illustration of such coercion was related by a private defense attorney, who told of a
felony case in which the judge interrupted his closing argument to summon
counsel to chambers. The judge asked what defendant would accept in return
for a guilty plea, and defense counsel replied, "a plea to a misdemeanor and a
suspended sentence." When the prosecutor interrupted to say that he was not
sure he could accept a plea to a misdemeanor, the judge retorted, "Mr. Solicitor, you just accepted it,"-and he did. The judge terminated the trial, entered
a guilty plea to a misdemeanor, and imposed a suspended sentence.
Apparently several reasons account for the judicial practice of suggesting
settlements just before or during trials. Several lawyers attributed it to the
desire of judges to speed the court's criminal docket and to avoid the possibility of reversal on appeal.60 Also, in at least some cases, the judges appear to
be motivated by a desire to give the defendant a lighter sentence than they
60. These observations parallel findings by Alschuler, who reports that the primary motivation of judges in encouraging settlement was to "process large caseloads with seriously inadequate

resources." Alschuler, Judge'rRole, supra note 2, at 1099. Moreover, a judge who is reluctant to
bargain may be inundated with demands forjury trials, made either by defense counsel wanting to
teach the judge a lesson in liberality or by defendants who refuse to plead guilty without a bar-
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believe could be justified following conviction by a jury, as in the case described in the preceding paragraph. Several of the defense attorneys stated
that they welcomed intervention of the judge whatever the reasons, because it
usually meant, as one private defense lawyer told me, that "a good deal will be
possible."'6 1 Similarly, another private practitioner said it was usually to his
client's advantage if the judge "calls him back" and says, "let's plead." A
third private defense attorney, however, was troubled by a judge's mention of
a specific sentence in return for the client's guilty plea. Indeed, this lawyer
stated that he would not inform the defendant of the sentence mentioned by
the judge for fear that it would place too much "pressure" on the client to

plead guilty. The lawyer explained that if he told the defendant of the sentence promised by the judge the defendant would
probably feel "that the trial
'62
was unfair and that he was being railroaded.

Efforts to obtain transcripts of conversations in which judges have sought
to induce defendants to plead guilty shortly before or during trials proved unsuccessful. Such colloquies are almost never recorded by a court reporter. In-

deed, the prosecutors and defense attorneys told me that virtually all
conversations with judges pertaining to plea bargaining, whether in chambers
or at the bench, and whether before or during trial or at the time a defendant
is scheduled .to plead, are unrecorded. Moreover, several of the defense attorneys stated that they preferred to have all discussions with the judge off-therecord. As one private defense lawyer explained, it would be "cumbersome" if
all conversations with judges were recorded verbatim, and he wanted the
gain. Id at 1101 & n.131. Alternatively, a presiding judge may pressure the trial judge to carry
his load. Id at 1102.
Heumann notes both "moving the business" and avoiding reversal on appeal as reasons why
judges seek settlements, and adds a third consideration:
[P]lea bargaining saves the judge some time and effort, and, overall, serves to make
his job easier. There is no need to prepare for a trial, to write instructions for the jury, to
rule on legal issues at stake in a case. Accepting a guilty plea and asking the defendant
the checklist of questions on the voluntariness of his plea is a much simpler process. And
when an agreed recommendation is part of the negotiated disposition, one of the most
vexing problems for a judge-sentencing--is also removed.
HEUMANN, supra note 1, at 144.
61. Alschuler reports that judges occasionally "blasted" defendants into guilty pleas by
threatening to impose the maximum sentence if the defendant were convicted at trial. Alschuler,
Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1090. A common response by the defense attorney was that
"U]udges use dynamite only on the defendant who deserves it--the defendant who is not amenable to sound advice. A judge can often be very helpful, and I am grateful when he is." .d
(footnote omitted). Alschuler also relates that judges often pressure defense attorneys, particularly
public defenders, to enter guilty pleas. Alschuler, supra note I, at 1237. Although most public
defenders claimed they did not let the pressure determine the outcome, some admitted that they
normally went along with the judge's suggestions, largely because the judge's actions were more
apt to compromise the prosecutor's position than to surrender the defendant's interests. Id at
1238. The judge's intervention, however, was more tolerated than welcomed. Id
62. This lawyer's conduct is in sharp contrast to ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-6.2(a) (2d ed. 1980): "In conducting discussions with the
prosecutor the lawyer should keep the accused advised of developments at all times and all proposals made by the prosecutor should be communicated promptly to the accused." If defense
counsel should inform the defendant of prosecutorial developments, it should be even more imperative to advise the defendant of statements made by the judge. This lawyer apparently balked
at what he viewed as coercive judicial participation, but it is difficult to understand how a defendant can make an intelligent plea choice if information concerning the judge's thoughts is withheld.
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judge to remain "loose;" if a court reporter were present, the atmosphere
would be more formal, making it more difficult to obtain favorable "deals"
from the judge. This attorney added that prosecutors probably would like to
have everything taken down verbatim, as that would prevent defense lawyers
from "making time with the judge."
Judges differed on whether discussions in which they are presented with
plea arrangements should be recorded. Judge C said he felt it was "impractical" to record all plea discussions at which he was present, and that such a
practice would cause little substantive change, it would "just make you more
careful about the way you put things." On the other hand, Judge D claimed
that he rarely participated in any plea discussions that were off-the-record,
whether in chambers or at the bench. He emphasized that it "looks bad,"
presumably to the public, to have conversations at the bench off-the-record,
and that in his view, "we've had too much secrecy in the court."
The questionnaire sent to the superior court judges asked them to indicate
whether they "initiate and/or participate in plea discussions before or during
the trial," and the extent to which such discussions are recorded verbatim.
Additional questions asked the judges to estimate the extent to which plea
discussions in which they participate are recorded when they occur in chambers, at the bench, and in open court in the absence of the jury. The responses
of the judges are summarized in Tables III-VII:
Table III
Extent to Which Judges Initiate and/or Participate in Plea
Discussions Shortly Before or During Trials

Always
Almost Always
Sometimes
Rarely
Never

No. of Judges
Responding

% of Judges
Responding

3
9
14
11
5
42

7
22
33
26
12
100%
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Table IV
Frequency That a Court Reporter Records What Is Said by the
Parties When Judge Initiates and/or Participates in Plea
Discussions Shortly Before or During Trials
No. of Judges
Responding
Always
Almost Always
Sometimes
Rarely
Never

% of Judges
Responding
3
14
28
55
100%

Table V
Frequency That a Court Reporter Records Everything That Is
Said by the Parties in Chambers When a Proposed
Sentence Agreement Is Discussed
Frequency of
Recording
0%
1-10%
11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%
51-60%
61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
91-100%

No. of Judges
Responding
28
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
34

% of Judges
Responding
82
18

100%
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Table VI
Frequency That a Court Reporter Records Everything That Is
Said by the Parties in the Courtroom at the Bench
When a Proposed Plea Agreement Is Discussed

Frequency of
Recording
0%
1-10%
11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%
51-60%

61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
91-100%

No. of Judges
Responding

% of Judges

21
5
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
33

65.7
15.6
3.1

Responding

15.6
100%

Table VII
Frequency That a Court Reporter Records Everything That Is
Said by the Parties in Open Court When a
Proposed Plea Agreement Is Discussed

Frequency of
Recording
0%
1-10%
11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%
51-60%
61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
91-100%

No. of Judges
Responding
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
33
37

% of Judges
Responding
2.7
2.7

2.7

2.27
89.2
100%

The foregoing tables support the statements of prosecutors and defense
attorneys that it is not uncommon for superior court judges to be involved in
plea discussions just before or during trials, and that such discussions are
rarely recorded by a court reporter. As reported in Table III, only five of
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forty-two judges (12%) stated that they "never" initiate and/or participate in
plea discussions shortly before or during trials, and only eleven judges (26%)
said that they did so "rarely," whereas twenty-six of the judges (62%) conceded
such initiation and/or participation either "sometimes," "almost always," or
"always." Tables IV through VII show that plea discussions in which judges
participate are not normally recorded. Only when a proposed plea agreement
is discussed in open court does a court reporter usually record everything that
is said (Table VII). When plea discussions occur shortly before or during trial
(Table IV), in the judge's chambers (Table V), or at the bench (Table VI),
however, what is said by the judge and the parties is almost never recorded.
2. Legality
It is clear that a defendant's guilty plea is not involuntary because induced by prosecution threats of greater charges if a plea bargain is rejected. In
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,63 the Supreme Court sustained as constitutional the
actions of a prosecutor who caused the accused to be reindicted on more serious charges because he refused to plead guilty to the offenses with which he
was originally charged. 64 The Court explained its rejection of defendant's due
process argument:
Plea bargaining flows from "the mutuality of advantage" to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to
avoid trial. Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected
by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to
be driven to false self-condemnation. Indeed, acceptance of the basic
legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional seense simply
because it is the end result of the bargaining process. By hypothesis,
the plea may have been induced by promises of a recommendation of
a lenient sentence or a reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the
possibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial ...
While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a 'discouraging effect on the defendant's
assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices
[is] an inevitable'--and permissible-'attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages, the negotiation of pleas.'. . . It
follows that, by tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas,
this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the
simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is
to persuade the defendant to forego his right to plead not guilty. 65
There is also little doubt that an unspoken judicial practice of rewarding
defendants who plead guilty by granting them more lenient sentences is constitutionally permissible. If it is commonly understood, for example, that a par63. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
64. Id at 365.
65. Id at 363-64 (citations omitted).
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ticular judge sentences defendants who plead guilty more leniently than those
who go to trial, a defendant who pleads and is sentenced by such a judge
cannot claim that the plea is involuntary because induced by the court's reputation. In Brady v. United States,66 the Supreme Court sustained the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea to kidnapping.67 Because the applicable law
provided that a defendant tried before a jury was subject to the death penalty,
defendant in Brady argued that his guilty plea was induced by a desire to
avoid a possible death sentence. 68 In rejecting defendant's argument that his
plea was involuntary, the Supreme Court, in dictum, stated that Brady's claim
was no different from that of other defendants who plead guilty because they
are told "the judge is normally more lenient with defendants who plead guilty
than with those who go to trial."'69 Brady was the first Supreme Court decision to recognize that "it is [not] unconstitutional for the State to extend a
benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State [by
,70
pleading guilty] ....
But what if the guilty plea is induced neither by prosecution threats nor
by the reputation of the judge, but is instead the result of judicial threats of a
greater sentence if a guilty plea is not entered? Or suppose the judge pressures
the defendant into pleading guilty by implying that a longer sentence will be
imposed if a plea offer is rejected? Will such conduct by a judge, who, unlike
the prosecutor, is supposed to be a neutral arbiter, render any ensuing guilty
plea involuntary? In North Carolina, as noted earlier, both prosecutors and
defense lawyers claimed-and some judges conceded-that defendants are
sometimes pressured into pleading guilty and threatened with longer sentences
7
if they refuse to do So. 1
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed directly the constitutionality of judicial threats or pressure to induce defendants to plead
guilty. 72 Several North Carolina cases have dealt with the issue, however. In
66. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
67. Id

at 751.

68. Id at 744.
69. Id at 751.
70. Id at 753.
71. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
72. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 751 n.8, the Supreme Court specifically reserved
this question:
We here make no reference to the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both,
deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty. In Brady's case there is no claim that the prosecutor
threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence or that the trial judge
threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted after trial in order to induce him
to plead guilty.
In Ramsey v. New York, 440 U.S. 444 (1979), the Supreme Court declined to review a case in
which the following question was presented:
whether a guilty plea is obtained in violation of due process of law when it is induced by
a judge's threat that, should the defendant be convicted after trial, he will receive a
sentence almost four times greater than one once seriously discussed, and more than
twice as great as the one held out as a part of a plea offer.
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the first North Carolina case on the subject, State v. Benfield,73 the trial judge
behaved in a manner that was similar to judicial conduct described to me by

lawyers, although the case was decided in 1965, more than ten years before my
interviews. During the trial of a robbery case, the judge conducted a confer-

ence with the prosecutor and defense counsel, at which he informed the defense lawyer that if there were a jury verdict of guilty the "defendant could

expect 'a long sentence.' ,,74 When advised by defense counsel of the court's
statement, defendant changed his plea to guilty. The Supreme Court of North

carolina held that the guilty plea was involuntary, notwithstanding that at the
time of its entry defendant claimed that his plea was freely and voluntarily
made.

75

In State v. Boone,76 defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property
following a jury trial and was sentenced. During the trial the court told defendant's counsel in chambers that defendant would receive "'an active prison
sentence if he persisted in his plea of not guilty and did not accept a lesser plea
proffered by the Assistant District Attorney.' "77 Subsequently, the judge
stated in open court "'that he would be compelled to give the defendant an
active sentence due to the fact that the defendant had pleaded not guilty and
the jury had returned a verdict of guilty as charged,' ",78 and that a "'prison

sentence would be necessary although the court was not familiar with the past
record or character of the defendant.' ,79 The Supreme Court of North Caro-

lina vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for
resentencing:

The statement of the trial judge, expressed by him in open court,
[d Although certiorari initially was granted, the case later was dismissed because it was said not
to be clear that the issue actually was contained in the record. [d
In its leading case on judicial vindictiveness at sentencing, the Supreme Court held that a
judge cannot impose a harsher sentence upon a defendant who is reconvicted following a successful appeal, unless the record clearly and objectively justifies the increased punishment based on
events since the first trial. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969). "[Slince the fear of
such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or
collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge." Id Arguably, the
Court's rationale in Pearceis applicable in cases in which defendants are fearful of pleading not
guilty and demanding a trial lest the judge penalize them by imposing a more severe sentence in
the event of conviction. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court distinguished that case
from Pearce:
To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a
due process violation of the most basic sort, see North Carolina tv.Pearce,supra... and
for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a
person's reliance on his legal rights is "patently unconstitutional." But in the "give-andtake" of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as
the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer.
434 U.S. at 363 (citations omitted). See text accompanying notes 63-65 Supra.
73. 264 N.C. 75, 140 S.E.2d 706 (1965).
74. Id at 77, 140 S.E.2d at 708.
75. Id
76. 293 N.C. 702, 239 S.E.2d 459 (1977).
77. Id at 712, 239 S.E.2d at 465.
78. Id
79. Id
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indicated that the sentence imposed was in part induced by defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights to plead not guilty and demand a trial by jury. This we cannot condone. . . . The trial judge
may have sentenced defendant quite fairly in the case at bar, but
there is a clear inference that a greater sentence was imposed because
defendant did not accept a lesser plea proffered by the State. Defendant had the right to plead not guilty, and
he should not and can80
not be punished for exercising that right.
In the third case, State v. Bagley,8 1 it was undisputed that the judge told
defense counsel during the trial and off-the-record that if defendant would
plead guilty the sentence would be ten years. The defense lawyer claimed that
in offering the ten year sentence, the judge also stated that the sentence
"'could save him [the defendant] some time.' "82 Defendant rejected the offer,
was convicted by the jury of possession and sale of heroin, and was sentenced
to fifteen years. In sustaining defendant's sentence, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals distinguished the case before it from Boone finding that, "[u]nlike
Boone. . . the record [was] devoid of any reasonable inference that defendant
was penalized for pleading not guilty."'8 3 The court noted that the sentence
offer was made before the judge had heard all the evidence, and that there was
evidence in the record to support the court's finding that defendant was a sub84
stantial heroin dealer.
There are two primary, interrelated lessons to be learned from the Benfield, Boone, and Bagley cases. The first is that a defendant who pleads guilty
as the result of a judicial threat of a greater sentence may be able to claim that
the plea is involuntary; the second is that a defendant cannot be "punished" or
"penalized" for pleading not guilty and insisting on a jury trial. These positions of the North Carolina courts, as well as the corollary proposition that a
defendant who pleads guilty can be rewarded for doing so, are adhered to by
85
courts everywhere.
80. Id at 712-13, 239 S.E.2d at 465.
81. 39 N.C. App. 328, 250 S.E.2d 87 (1979).

82. Id at 333, 250 S.E.2d at 90.
83. Id
84. Id
85. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (Constitution does not prohibit
granting leniency to defendants who plead guilty and thereby benefit the state); United States v.
Thompson, 476 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 918 (1973) (granting leniency to defendants who plead guilty does not mean that defendants who insist on trial are penalized if
leniency not received); United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
948 (1973) (record must show that defendant's sentence was not punishment for refusing to plead
guilty); United States exrel. Dale v. Williams, 459 F.2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1972) (guilty pleas entered in

anticipation of leniency may be accepted in return for cooperation with prosecution); United
States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (defendant's guilty plea not voluntary when trial

judge announced that in the event of conviction at trial he would impose a life sentence, the
maximum penalty); People v. Jackson, 79 Ill. App. 3d 698, 398 N.E.2d 959 (1979) (defendant may
not be penalized by imposition of harsher sentence for exercising right to jury trial); People v.
Palmer, 55 Mich. App. 43, 222 N.W.2d 26 (1974) (defendant's cooperation is appropriate consideration in deciding whether to grant charge or sentence concessions); State v. Lacy, 195 Neb. 299,
237 N.W.2d 650 (1976) (a more severe sentence cannot be imposed to punish a convicted defendant for insisting on a trial, but sentence concessions are proper when a defendant pleads guilty);
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The revised ABA Pleas of Guilty standards also agree that a defendant
cannot be penalized for electing to stand trial:

The court should not impose upon a defendant any sentence in
excess of that which would be justified by any of the protective, de-

terrent, or other purposes of the criminal law because the defendant
has chosen to require the prosecution to prove guilt
at trial rather
or nolo contendere. s6

than to enter a plea of guilty
The ABA, however, does approve "sentence concessions to defendants who
enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere when consistent with the protection of
the public, the gravity of the offense, and the needs of the defendant, and when
there is substantial evidence to establish that" certain other conditions are
present.8 7 Thus, assuming adherence to the ABA's standards, greater

sentences for those who are tried and convicted compared to those who plead
guilty does not mean that the former are being punished; it simply reflects that
the latter are being rewarded.

Unfortunately, for the defendant convicted following a trial, there is a
significant problem in applying the North Carolina cases and the ABA standards: how can the defendant know that the sentence imposed is not-in the
words of the ABA--"in excess of that which would be justified by any of the
protective, deterrent, or other purposes of the criminal law"? 88 How can the
defendant be certain that he or she is not being "punished" or "penalized" for
having exercised the constitutional right to trial? There is, of course, no way
of knowing whether such punishment has been imposed unless the court actually announces that the defendant's sentence includes a penalty for having
insisted on a trial, as arguably occurred in the Bagley and Boone cases.8 9 Fur-

thermore, probably no procedure can be devised for assuring that defendants
are never punished for insisting on a trial. 90 There is, however, a proposal that
would, if adopted, make some critics of plea bargaining more comfortable.
State v. Black Bear, 187 Neb. 670, 193 N.W.2d 563 (1972) (court may grant charge and sentence
concessions to defendants who plead guilty).
86. ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-1.8(b).
87. Id Standard 14-1.8(a). The "other conditions" cited include that defendant be willing to
bear responsibility for his or her acts; that concessions will facilitate more suitable alternative
correctional measures or prevent harm to defendant from the form of conviction; that defendant
has shown a desire to make reimbursement or spare the victim(s) the ordeal of trial; and that
defendant's cooperation with the prosecution may lead to the apprehension of other offenders. Id
88. Id Standard 14-1.8(b).
89. Yet, even inBagley and Boone, the appellate courts in reviewing the trial judges' actions
focused on inferences, as appears in the quote in the text accompanying note 80 supra. The sentence imposed on Boone actually may have been entirely appropriate given the evidence brought
out at trial, and thus may have been adeluately justified by the "protective, deterrent, or other
purposes of the criminal law" referred to m ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 141.8(b). Conversely, the harsher sentence imposed on defendant Bagley may actually have been in
retaliation for not accepting the judge's plea bargain, even though the judge did not make any
threatening statements about a penalty, and even though the North Carolina Court of Appeals
decided in hindsight that the sentence was justified by the evidence. In neither case can it be
known with absolute certainty what was in the judge's mind and whether the defendant was penalized for insisting on a trial.
90. Determinate sentencing laws, which specify a sentence range for a given offense, limit
judicial discretion and make it more difficult for a judge to impose a harsher sentence as punishment for a defendant who insists on trial. See ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Commentary
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The judge, upon request of the defense, would announce in advance of trial
the length of the defendant's sentence in the event of conviction following a

trial, and the reduction, if any, if the defendant pleads guilty.9 1 This procedure has the dual virtues of permitting the defendant to learn precisely how he

or she will benefit from pleading guilty, and of bringing into the open sentencing practices that generally escape appellate review and public scrutiny.
IV.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

It is evident from the foregoing description of North Carolina procedures
that the superior court judge has exceedingly broad discretion in plea negotiations. A superior court judge, for example, may permit the prosecutor and
defense attorney to discuss a plea arrangement with the court, and may permit
disclosure to the court of a negotiated settlement containing a recommended
sentence. 92 On the other hand, in the exercise of its absolute, unreviewable
discretion, the trial court may flatly refuse to permit plea discussions in its
presence, and may also refuse in advance of the time for the tender of the plea
to permit the parties to disclose the proposed terms of a negotiated settlement. 93 No statute, court rules, standards, or informal guidelines of any kind
at ch. 14-44-5; Alsehuler, SentencingReform andProsecutorialPower:A Critiqueof Recent Proposalsfor 'Tixed" and 'Presumptive' Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978).
Several states have enacted determinate sentencing statutes. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170
(West Cum. Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-1-1 (Bums 1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1252 (Supp. 1980). Typically under these laws, judges retain authority to increase or decrease
the defendant's sentence based on mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as defined by statute.
These factors normally are unrelated to the existence of a guilty plea. ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY,
supra note 7, at ch. 14-45. For discussion of the new North Carolina determinate sentencing
statute scheduled to take effect in 1981, see notes 141-143 and accompanying text infra.
91. This idea appears to have been broached first in a Yale Law Review note, Note, supra
note 57, at 301. It was endorsed substantially by Alschuler in Judge'sRole, supra note 2, at 112426. The suggested procedure as set out in the Note called for the defendant to be given the opportunity at his or her first court appearance to request a preplea conference. Assuming one were
requested, a social investigation report would be compiled and reviewed at the conference, along
with a proposed disposition of the case presented separately by the prosecution and defense.
Charge reduction would be arrived at by the judge, eliminating prosecutorial overcharging. After
the conference, the court would reveal its judgment of a proper sentence if the defendant were
convicted at trial, plus its recommendation for a reduced sentence upon a plea of guilty. The
reduced sentence would be calculated by applying a specific discount rate based upon a median
plea concession in the jurisdiction. This procedure would greatly reduce the judge's sentencing
discretion and afford the defendant certain knowledge of the sentence to be received. The defendant would then elect either to accept the reduced sentence or go to trial. The entire conference
would be transcribed. Such a process, it has been argued, would produce more uniform and less
arbitrary sentences following guilty pleas. Alschuler, Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1125. It also
would allow the defendant a more rational role in plea bargaining, would curb prosecutorial and
judicial discretion, and would save time and resources. Note, supra note 57, at 304. Miller endorses a form of the Yale note proposal, but would not use the preplea conference if the parties
have agreed upon a sentence among themselves. Miller, supra note 1, at ch. V-28-29, ch. VI-38-40.
See Enker, Perspectiveson PleaBargaining,in TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108 (App. A
1967). For further discussion of these proposals, see note 136 infra.
92. See statutes cited note 18 supra; text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(c) (1978). See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra. No
case has been discovered in which the absolute discretion of the trial judge regarding preliminary
consideration of plea agreements has been challenged. Presumably, the judge's discretion is not
without bounds. For example, if a judge announced that he or she would participate in plea
discussions or would permit disclosure of tentative plea arrangements only for defendants whose
cases were calendared for Mondays, surely an appellate court would view the policy as an arbi-
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guide the judge in deciding whether and how to participate in plea discussions,
and whether to permit disclosure of negotiated settlements. Moreover, a particular judge's attitude toward plea arrangements, once it becomes known to
the parties, substantially influences whether sentence recommendations are ne94
gotiated between the parties and submitted to the court.
Similarly, the trial court has .complete discretion to decide whether to intervene prior to or during a trial in an effort to persuade a defendant to enter a
plea.95 Again, no rules, standards, or informal guidelines prescribe the trial
court's conduct in this sensitive area. And perhaps most importantly, virtually
all involvement of trial judges in plea negotiations occurs outside the presence
of court reporters; neither 96
appellate courts nor the public are able to learn with
certainty what transpires.

Furthermore, it is clear that these procedures for plea negotiations are
vastly different from all other phases of the criminal case in which the judge is
involved. At all other stages of the criminal proceeding, virtually everything
that is said is recorded verbatim. We thus insist on being able to learn, for
example, whether the trial court was guilty of overreaching or other misconduct, or whether there was an innocent judgment error that prejudiced the
fairness of the proceeding. Moreover, during the actual entry of a guilty plea,
a verbatim transcript is required to be made and preserved, in order that any
subsequent
challenge to the plea on grounds of voluntariness can be fully in97
spected.
At no other stage of a criminal case does a judge have absolute discretion
to decide whether to conduct a certain type of hearing. For example, a judge
cannot decide that in a particular felony case or class of felonies there should
not be a preliminary hearing or that the defendant should not be accorded a
trial; nor does a judge have discretion to refuse to sentence a defendant who
has entered a guilty plea. Although there surely are sound reasons for according judges broad discretion in a variety of situations, particularly in the conduct of trials and in ruling on objections to evidence, 98 only in the area of plea
trary and capricious exercise of discretion. Absent such an extreme policy, vast discretion in the
trial judge is accepted without the slightest question.
94. See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1026 (1978). See note 18 supra (text of statute).
98. Five reasons have been suggested for granting a trial judge unreviewable discretion: (1)
to prevent appellate courts from becoming overburdened; (2) to maintain the morale of trial
judges by removing from review all of their decisions; (3) to provide finality; (4) because of the
impracticability of formulating rules to govern the exercise of discretion on some matters; and (5)
because the trial judge is sometimes in a superior position to observe and understand the matters
on which he or she rules. Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretionof the Trial Court, Viewedfrom Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971). The first three reasons can be criticized as failing to provide a basis
for determining which decisions should be reviewable. Id at 660-62. None of the reasons, moreover, would seem to justify total judicial discretion in plea bargaining. The trial judge's decision
on the acceptability of a plea arrangement is nonappealable in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1023(b) (1978); see note 18 supra (text of statute). The subject of discretion in various
contexts is explored in K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); K.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (1976); Davis, DiscretionaryJustice,

23 J. LEOAL EDUc. 56 (1971).
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negotiations has a system developed in which the judge has total discretion to
decide whether and how he will even deign to participate in the proceedings.
The broad discretion available to the trial judge in North Carolina is similar to that accorded to judges in other states. Except for expressly permitting
superior court judges to participate in actual plea discussions, the North Carolina law closely resembles statutes and rules in other jurisdictions.99 Most importantly, the absolute discretion of the trial court to decide whether to permit
disclosure of tentative plea agreements prior to the time scheduled for the defendant to plea is a common feature of these statutes.
The notion that the trial court should have complete discretion to define
its participation in plea negotiations can be traced to the first edition of ABA
Pleas of Guilty standards approved in 1968.100 These standards were the first
to propose detailed procedures for plea negotiations, including a limited degree of judicial participation:
If a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates
entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in the expectation that
other charges before that court will be dismissed or that sentence
concessions will be granted, upon request of the parties the trial
judge maypermit the disclosure to him of the tentative agreement and

the reasons therefore in advance of the time for tender of the plea.
He may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will concur in the proposed disposition if the information in the presentence report is consistent with the representations
made to him.1° 1
These ABA standards, however, did not seek to justify the trial court's
total discretion to decide whether to permit the parties to apprise the judge of a
tentative plea agreement or whether the judge should indicate approval of the
proposed disposition. Indeed, the commentary to the standard invited every
judge to make up his or her own mind and act accordingly:
It must be emphasized that the standard does not compel the trial
judge to receive advance notice of the plea agreement and the reasons therefor or to make any advance indication of the probable disposition. Many trial judges may appropriately conclude that the
preferable practice is to receive advance notice concerning the plea
agreement and to make an advance commitment only when necessary, i.e., in the case of a tendered plea to a lesser offense. The standard merely recognizes the propriety of limited advance consultation
with the trial judge, with his permission and upon request from the
parties, concerning the probable disposition upon entry of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere. The thrust of this standard, then, is that it
is not improper for the judge to give some greater degree of certainty
to the plea agreement process if, in his judgment, that can be accomplished in a manner which is consistent with the effective operation
99. See, e.g., statutes cited at note 5 supra.
100. ABA PROJECT ON
OF GUILTY (1968).

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS

101. Id Standard 3.3(b) (emphasis added).
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of his court.'
Subsequent to publication of these 1968 ABA standards, other national
groups formulated guidelines authorizing trial courts to consider, in the exercise of their complete discretion, plea agreements negotiated by the parties.
Provisions similar to those prepared by the ABA are included in the 1973 standards of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals,' 0 3 the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure approved by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1974,104 and the 1975 standards of
the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.' 05
Remarkably, however, in not a single one of these documents is an effort made
to justify the unbridled discretion given to the judiciary in the plea negotiation
area.
There are, to be sure, serious problems with a system that permits the trial
court to determine, in its absolute discretion, whether and how to participate
in plea discussions or whether even to consider plea agreements negotiated
between the parties. Most importantly, there is the high probability that similarly situated defendants will be dealt with differently. When some defense
counsel are permitted to discuss a plea with the judge or to submit a proposed
settlement to the court for its consideration, inevitably some defendants will be
benefited by the discussions and the advocacy of their attorneys; other defendants, represented by attorneys denied the same opportunities, may be convicted or plead guilty to greater charges and suffer more severe punishments.
To illustrate the possibilities that may occur under North Carolina law
and practices, consider the hypothetical cases of two defendants with identical
backgrounds charged with armed robbery. The prosecutor offers both defendants the opportunity to plead to the lesser offense of common-law robbery,
and, in an effort to treat both defendants identically, offers to recommend to
the judge a sentence of two years for each defendant. One defendant's case is
before Judge X, who wishes to be advised of and discusses plea agreements
negotiated between the parties, and who agrees to and later imposes the prosecutor's recommended sentence of two years. The second defendant's case is
before Judge Y, who is opposed to judicial participation in plea negotiations,
who will not permit disclosure to the court of plea agreements, and who will
never indicate, prior to entry of a guilty plea, the sentence that will be imposed. Consequently, the second defendant, unable even to submit the negotiated agreement to the court for its consideration, let alone learn of the court's
reaction to a recommended sentence of two years, proceeds to a trial on the
charge of armed robbery. The trial results in conviction, and the court, consistent with its policy of sentencing those who go to trial more harshly than defendants who plead guilty, imposes a sentence often years. Ironically, perhaps
102. Id Commentary, at 76.

103. NAC COURTS, supra note 2, Standard 3.2 (judge must give his reasons for rejecting a plea
agreement).
104. URCP, supra note 7, Rule 443(b).
105. ALI CODF, supra note 7, § 350.3(5).
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the second judge would have found the negotiated plea agreement satisfactory
f disclosure of its content had been permitted, and i the attorneys had been
allowed to discuss the case and defendant's background in the court's presence. Because, however, the court refused to be a part of the negotiation process, the prosecution and defense were denied the opportunity to persuade the
court of the wisdom of the proposed sentence recommendation.
V.

REFORM: THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS AND SOME
SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS

In view of my complaints concerning North Carolina's plea negotiation
statute and plea bargaining practices, it will come as no surprise to learn that I
believe procedural changes are necessary. To explain my proposals, it is
useful first to examine several of the recommendations contained in the second
edition of the ABA's Pleas of Guilty standards approved in 1979.106 Although
these standards are by no means problem-free, their adoption in North Carolina and in other states would be exceedingly helpful.
These standards differ in several major respects from those approved by
the ABA in its first edition issued in 1968 and also from standards that have
been recommended by other groups. The ABA and other national organizations, as noted earlier, have sanctioned for a long while judicial participation
to the extent of permitting sentence agreements negotiated between the parties
to be submitted to the trial court for approval or rejection.' 0 7 The revised
ABA standards continue this option, but unlike its first edition of standards,
the ABA now specifically authorizes judicial participation in plea negotiations
"[w]hen the parties are unable to reach a plea agreement [among themselves]" 10 8 and both the prosecution and defense request a meeting with the
judge.109

There are significant differences, however, between the judicial participation in plea negotiations authorized under the North Carolina statute and that
permitted pursuant to the new ABA standards. As we have seen, the statute in
North Carolina simply states that the trial judge "may participate in the [plea]
discussions." 1 There are no standards to guide the court in deciding when
and in what manner to participate, nor is there any requirement of a verbatim
record of the court's participation. In contrast, the ABA's new standards require that all plea discussions at which the trial judge is present "be recorded
106. ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7.
107.

ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS

OF GUILTY, Standard 3.3(b) (1968); NAC COURTS, supra note 2, Standards 3.2, 3.7; URCP, supra
note 7, Rule 443(b); ALI CODE, supra note 7, §§ 350.3(5), .5(1).
108. ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-3.3(c).
109. Id For a report on the implementation of a plea negotiation conference procedure in
Dade County, Florida, see U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: AN
EVALUATION (1979); see also NAT'L INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STRUCTURED PLEA NEGOTIATIONS TEST DESIqN (May 1979).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(a) (Supp. 1979). See note 18 supra (text of statute). For
authorities dealing generally with judicial participation in plea negotiations, see note 124 infra.
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verbatim and preserved."'' In addition, plea discussions in which the judge
participates are required to "be held in open court unless good cause is present
for the proceedings to be held in chambers."" l 2 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the judge is admonished to "serve as a moderator in listening to
. . . presentations concerning appropriate charge or sentence concessions," ' 1 3
while "never through word or demeanor. . . communicat[ing] to the defendant or defense counsel that a plea agreement should be accepted or that a
guilty plea should be entered."1 4 If the parties neither advise the court that a
plea agreement has been negotiated nor request to meet with the court, the
trial judge is authorized to "inquire of the parties whether disposition without
trial has been explored and may allow an adjournment to enable plea discus-

sions to occur."1' 15

If enacted in North Carolina, these ABA recommendations would significantly improve plea negotiation practices. A transcript of all plea discussions
in which the trial court participated would make it possible, as noted in the
commentary to the revised ABA standards, "to. . . review. . . allegations of
overreaching by the judge."' "1 6 Superior court judges, moreover, would be
provided explicit guidance governing their participation in the plea bargaining
process. Admonished about how to conduct themselves during plea negotiations, the risk that their actions might undermine the voluntariness of guilty
pleas would be reduced. Adoption of the ABA standards also would define
the role that judges may play just prior to the beginning of a trial. A judge
could inquire of the parties whether there had been plea discussions and
whether an adjournment for discussions would be useful, thus eliminating the
more extensive-and sometimes coercive-judicial involvement that presently
occurs. "17

There are, however, two major shortcomings in the ABA's revised standards. The most significant shortcoming is the absolute discretion the judge is
permitted to exercise in deciding whether to participate in plea discussions and
whether to allow an agreement negotiated between the parties to be submitted
to the court. In this respect, the revised ABA standards are no different and no
better than the first edition approved in 1968. Pursuant to the first edition, the
S11.ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-3.3(f).
112. Id The Commentary provides:
Normally, therefore, a judge should not allow plea discussions in which he or she is
involved to take place in chambers. The judge is the ultimate dispenser of justice, and
justice should be publicly done. In rare situations where full public disclosure would not
be in the interests of justice, for example, where it would jeopardize on-going police
investigations or where it would force disclosure of an informant's identity, the judge
may permit discussions to take place in chambers. These same types of situations would
also be sufficient grounds for the judge to order the transcript of the plea discussions to
be sealed....
Id Commentary, at 14.85.
113. Id Standard 14-3.3(c).
114. Id Standard 14-3.3(0.
115. Id Standard 14-3.3(e).
116. Id Commentary at 14.85.
117. See text accompanying notes 56-83 supra.
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trial court had complete discretion to decide whether to consider an agreement
negotiated between the parties;" 18 under the revised ABA standards, the trial
court has the same discretion, as well as complete discretion to decide whether

to participate in plea discussions when requested to do so by the parties.

19

Absolute discretion also is accorded the trial court in another important

way under the revised ABA standards. If the trial court permits a settlement
negotiated between the parties to be submitted for its consideration, the court,

in the exercise of its absolute discretion, may then advise the defendant
whether the proposed sentence concessions are satisfactory; alternatively, the

trial court may, if it wishes, defer decision on whether to accept or reject the
20
sentence concessions until after a preplea or presentence report is prepared.1
As we have seen, if the defendant does not receive the sentence contained in

the plea agreement, withdrawal of the plea is not permitted unless the trial
court previously concurred either "tentatively or fully" in the contemplated
sentence, or expressly conditioned the guilty plea on the court's acceptance of
2
the agreement.' 1

Neither the black letter nor the commentary to the revised ABA standards
provides any justification for according the trial court absolute discretion in
deciding whether (1) to consider a settlement negotiated between the parties;
(2) to participate in plea discussions upon request of the parties; and (3) to

advise a defendant in advance of a guilty plea or sentence whether the sen118. See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
119. When the parties are unable to reach a plea agreement, if the defendant's counsel
and prosecutor agree, they may request to meet with the judge in order to discuss a plea
agreement. If thejudge agreesto meet with theparties, the judge shall serve as a moderator in listening to their respective presentations concerning appropriate charge or sentence concessions.
ABA PLEAs OF GuiLTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-3.3(c) (emphasis added). The Commentary
further discusses Standard 14-3.3(c):
Paragraph (c) continues where the first edition left off by providing regulations for
the judge's conduct when presented with a plea agreement submitted by the parties.
Specifically, this provision anticipates two types of situations arising where the parties
may seek to confer with the judge. The first is where the parties have arrived at a plea
agreement and wish to meet with the judge to determine the judge's reaction. This is
similar to the procedure outlined in the first edition in which the parties could present
the judge with a plea agreement to determine whether it was acceptable. The parties also
may request a conference with the judge when they cannot arrive at an agreement but
want to ascertain whether the judge is willing to indicate the charge and sentence concessions that would be acceptable.
Id Commentary, at 14.83.
120. Id Standard 14-3.3(b):
If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties which contemplates the granting
of charge or sentence concessions by the judge, the judge should:
(i) order the preparation of a preplea or presentence report, when needed for determining the appropriate disposition;
(ii) give the agreement due consideration, but notwithstanding its existence reach
an independent decision on whether to grant charge or sentence concessions; and
(ii) in every case advise the defendant whether the judge accepts or rejects the
a decision on report
acceptance
will be
contemplated charge or sentence concessions or whether
is receied.
orpresentence
deferred until after the plea is entered and/orapreplea
(Emphasis added).
121. Id Standard 14-3.3(g). See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
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tence negotiated between the parties is acceptable. The arguments in the com-

mentary in favor of authorizing the judge to decide whether to participate in
plea discussions and whether to reveal the defendant's sentence prior to a plea
or sentence, are, in reality, arguments in favor of always requiring that the
judge engage in plea discussions when requested to do so, and of always disclosing the defendant's sentence before entry of a plea or the imposition of
sentence:
Several advantages are afforded by these new procedures. First,

the defendant may be able to learn whether a satisfactory plea agreement can be negotiated. Although a judge is not required to meet

with the parties or reveal the charge and sentence concessions that
would be acceptable, a judge may do so if he or she wishes, and thus

defendants may be able to acquire the information they most want to
have. As one writer has argued, 'Defendants contemplating a guilty
plea want to know, need to know, and. . . are entitled to know the
sentence or the upper limits of the sentence they face in those in-

stances where the judge can fairly predict his disposition at the time
of the plea.' The procedure

. . .

makes it more likely that the de-

22
fendant will be able to learn of the sentence intended by the court.1

The second major difficulty with the revised ABA standards is the re-

quirement that, as a precondition for judicial participation in plea discussions,
12 3
both prosecution and defense must request to meet with the trial court.

Surely it makes sense to forbid the trial court from injecting itself into plea
negotiations when the defendant has no desire nor inclination to plead guilty.
Such action by the judge might very well coerce a reluctant defendant into
pleading guilty and thus threaten the voluntariness of any ensuing guilty
plan. 124 But when the defendant wants to discuss with the judge the sentence
122. Id Commentary, at 14.83 (quoting Uviller, PleadingGuilty" A Critique of Four Models,
41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102, 117 (1977)).
123. See ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-3.3(c); note 102 supra; text accompanying notes 108-109 supra.
124. Alschuler notes:
A trial judge also should not initiate the plea negotiation process. For a judge to
raise the prospect that a particular defendant might plead guilty would be likely to indicate a judicial preference that he do so-at least to a defendant willing to read between
the lines. Even this possibly unintended persuasion would be inconsistent with a trial
judge's obligation of impartiality.
Alschuler, Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1123 (footnotes omitted).
The decisions whether to initiate the bargaining process should be left to the defendant and his attorney, and the trial judge should be forbidden from participating in or
influencing this decision. To enforce this limitation of the trial judge's role, a guilty plea
induced by negotiations that the judge had initiated should be subject to later attack.
Id at 1146 (footnotes omitted). See note 72 supra. Bond discusses this issue in similar terms
within the context of the North Carolina plea bargaining statute in Bond, supra note 16, at 826-28.
But see United States ex rel McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963) (plea found
voluntary despite judicial participation and despite defendant's unwillingness to plead guilty until
case was called for trial and defendant spoke to judge and defense counsel in judge's chambers);
Alschuler, Judge's Role, wpra note 2, at 1103, n.140 (citing cases that refused to set aside pleas
induced by judicial participation in plea bargaining).
See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); United States ex re. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS §§ 6.146.19 (1978) (contains arguments and cases concerning judicial participation in plea negotiations);
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that will be imposed, why should consent of the prosecutor to meet with the
25
judge be a precondition? As the power to sentence is solely in the judge,1
why should not the defense be afforded the opportunity to persuade the judge
of the sentence that is believed to be appropriate? 126 The difficulty created for
the defense by a rule that requires prosecution approval before a plea discussion with the judge can be held may be illustrated by considering a hypothetical case in which the prosecution and defense disagree concerning the length
of the defendant's sentence. Assume that the prosecutor is prepared to recommend no less than a five year sentence for the defendant; the defense believes
that at most a sentence of two to three years is justified. Under the revised
ABA standards, the defense is precluded from discussing the impasse with the
judge unless the prosecutor consents. Assuming that the prosecutor rejects a
meeting and the defendant still wishes to plead guilty, the defense can either
accept the prosecutor's five year recommended sentence or plead guilty without a plea argument. Thus, the revised ABA standards give the prosecutor
substantial and unwarranted control over the sentencing function. 127 Significantly, the requirement that both prosecution and defense must agree to meet
with the court is not explained in either the black letter or commentary of the
ABA standards. Ironically, under the current North Carolina statute, permission of the prosecutor is not a precondition for the defense to meet with the
judge.12 8 Unfortunately, none of the important protections urged by the ABA
to safeguard the plea negotiation process are available either.
In view of the various suggestions contained in this Article, it may be
useful at this point to summarize the manner in which I believe plea negotiations should take place. First, the prosecution and defense should continue to
Alschuler, Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1103 nn.138-139; Barkai,AccuracylnquiriesforAllFelony
andMisdemeanorPleas: Voluntary PleasBut Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 88-94
(1977) (discusses evolution of voluntariness of guilty pleas as a due process requirement).
125. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.

126. Under the proposal made in Note, supra note 57, at 300-03 and endorsed by Alschuler,
Judge'rRole, supra note 2, at 1124-26, plea negotiations would be initiated by defendant or defense counsel, thereby limiting the control of the prosecutor. For discussion of the Yale proposal,
see note 91 supra.
127. The prosecutor inevitably does exercise some control over sentencing:
The prosecutor currently exercises, as he has for some time, inadvertent control over
sentencing by virtue of his discretionary power. First of all, his decision whether or not
to prosecute has an obvious impact on sentencing ...
Secondly, where the facts fit more than one statutorily defined offense, the prosecutor can, by virtue of his discretionary power determine the section under which the
charge will be brought. If his decision involves the choice of a felony vs. a misdemeanor
charge, its effects may be highly influential. For example, the decision "will often determine whether the defendant, if convicted, will be eligible for probation. In addition, the
place of confinement--state prison or county jail-may be determined by the prosecutor's decision. Finally, the maximum-minimum limitation of the indeterminate sentence
will often vary according to the charge selected."
Perhaps the prosecutor's greatest impact on sentencing lies in the area of plea negotiation....
NATIONAL DISTRIcT ATTORNEYS AssoCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECurION STANDARDS 290 (1977)
(footnotes omitted). See note 21 supra. There is no justification, however, for broadening the
prosecutor's sentencing control to the extent permitted by the ABA standards.
128. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(a) (1978); note 18 supra (text of statute).
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be able to negotiate among themselves respecting the dismissal and reduction
of charges, and the length of the defendant's sentence.12 9 Regardless of
whether an agreement were reached, the defense could request a conference

with the trial court to discuss a disposition of the case. The judge would be
required to hold and preside at the conference, and the prosecutor would be

obliged to participate.'

30

If the parties had already reached an agreement on

sentence and the charges to which the defendant was willing to plead, the

conference would focus on the justification for the proposed disposition. If no
agreement had been reached, both sides would come to the conference pre-

pared to justify the charge or charges to which the defendant should plead,

and the sentence deemed to be most appropriate.' 3 ' The principal subjects

discussed at the conference would be the conduct with which the defendant
was charged and the defendant's past record, employment, and social history.
All such discussions would be recorded verbatim, and the demanor of the
judge should be impassive.' 32 Although the court would neither encourage
nor discourage a guilty plea, the court could, in the exercise of its discretion,
"require or allow any person, including the defendant, the alleged victim, and
others, to appear or to testify," as recommended by the revised ABA standards. 133 In view of the importance of the conference to the defendant's future, the defendant would have a right to attend and to speak.' 34 The trial
129. This is a major point of difference between my proposal and the Yale, see Note, supra
note 57, at 300-03, and Aschuler, see Alschuler, Judge'sRole, supra note 2, at 1146-49, proposals.
The Yale proposal would strongly discourage negotiations between defense and prosecution prior
to any conference with the trial judge, whereas Alschuler proposes that such negotiations be prohibited. In my judgment, it is unrealistic to expect a ban on plea negotiating between prosecution
and defense to be successful. In addition, there undoubtedly are cases in which such negotiations
can be concluded to the mutual advantage of both sides, and with the additional benefit of conserving judicial time. Enker, supra note 91, at 117-18, and Miller, supra note 1, at ch. IV-26 also
would allow a bargain to be struck without a judicial conference.
130. I agree with the ABA recommendation, ABA PLEAS oF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard
14-3.3(f), that normally the plea conference should be held in open court. For the text of the ABA
standard and its rationale, see note 112 and accompanying text supra.
131. This is consistent with all authorities cited in note 129 supra.
132. This follows the Yale proposal, Note, supra note 57, at 301, and Alschuler's proposal,
Alschuler, Judge'sRole,supra note 2, at 1148. Enker suggests that a record should be made of the
conference if the parties previously had been unsuccessful in arriving at an agreement but would
be unnecessary if the judge were merely reviewing an agreement already reached. Enker, supra
note 91, at 118.
133. ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-3.3(d). The possibility of such testimony also is envisioned by the Yale proposal, Note, supra note 57, at 301, and by Alschuler,
Alschuler, Judge'sRole, supra note 2, at 1124.
134. Alschuler argues that the defendant must be permitted to attend the conference, citing
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 271 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) for the principle that the defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront witnesses extends to other stages of his trial. Alschuler, Judge'sRole,
supra note 2, at 1134-36 & n.244. The policy arguments advanced by Alschuler are particularly
persuasive:
A defendant who learns the outcome of a plea bargaining session second-hand can
never be entirely certain that his attorney adequately represented him during the negotiations. Indeed, the defendant may sometimes suspect his attorney of deliberate betrayal,
particularly when the attorney was appointed by the court rather than selected by the
defendant. The defendant may also suspect that the prosecutor or trial judge who negotiated the bargain was harsh, corrupt, incompetent, or insensitive; he may suspect that
racism or other forms of prs*judice infected the proceedings; he may, in short, suspect
that his interests were inadequately considered for a variety of reasons or-what may be
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court would be required to disclose, preferably after reviewing a preplea report prepared with the consent of the defendant, 135 the sentence that would be
worse-that his lawyer secured a favorable bargain improperly. The presence of defendants during plea bargaining sessions could help to allay their suspicions of laziness, incompetence or impropriety when these suspicions are in fact unfounded. Too often,
moreover, secret bargaining sessions do facilitate the abuses that defendants fear, and the
presence of defendants during the plea bargaining process might therefore affect both the
tone and the substance of this process in a desirable way. Specifically, the presence of
defendants might encourage more vigorous advocacy on the part of defense attorneys
and discourage the deprecating banter, the invocation of improper considerations, and
the granting of improper favors that may sometimes occur between friends.
Although defendants rarely attend plea bargaining sessions today, only two arguments have been advanced in support of their exclusion: first, that they would not understand the proceedings, and second, that their presence might impair the frank
interchange between prosecutors and defense attorneys that characterizes plea bargaining today, an interchange that usually works to the defendant's advantage. Phrased less
generously, the first objection is apparently that defendants would see our criminal justice system as it is; and the second, that it is easier to disparage defendants and to violate
their confidences behind their backs than to do so to their faces. Depending on one's
viewpoint, these defects might reasonably qualify as advantages. Excluding defendants
from plea bargaining sessions plainly cannot lead them to understand these sessions better, and to view the danger that a defendant might "misinterpret" the bargaining process
as a justification for keeping him ignorant of it seems the height of paternalism.
Id at 1135-36 (footnotes omitted).
In contrast, ABA PLEAS OF GuILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-3.3(d) does not recognize an
absolute right of the defendant to attend the conference: "[w]henever the judge is presented with a
plea agreement or consents to a conference in order to listen to the parties concerning charge or
sentence concessions, the court may require or allow any person, including the defendant, the
alleged victim, and others, to appear or to testify." The Yale proposal, Note, supra note 57, Enker,
supra note 91, and Miller, supra note 1,do not address specifically the defendant's right to be
present at the conference.
135. The commentary to the ABA Standards stresses the importance of the preplea report:
There is much to be said for a court deferring acceptance of the plea and its responses to a plea agreement until preparation ofa preplea report. Postponing acceptance
until all relevant information is available assures the most intelligent exercise of the
court's sentencing discretion. Review of the preplea report also can enhance the quality
of the judge's decision on whether to approve a plea to a lesser included offense in those
jurisdictions where judicial consent is required. Since acceptance of the plea may therefore bar prosecution for the greater offense, such decisions must be carefully made. Of
course, preparation of a preplea report should not be undertaken without the defendant's
consent.
ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-3.3(b), Commentary, at 14.81.
The defendant's consent for preparation of the preplea report is covered in ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES]:
Standard 18-5.2. Presentence report: when prepared.
(a) Except as authorized in paragraph (b), the presentence investigation should not
be initiated until there has been an adjudication of guilt.
(b) It is appropriate to commence the presentence investigation prior to an adjudication of guilt only if.
(i) The defendant, with the advice of counsel if the defendant so desires, has
consented to such action; and
(ii) adequate precautions are taken to assure that nothing disclosed by the
presentence investigation comes to the attention of the prosecution, the court, or the
jury prior to an adjudication of guilt. The court should be authorized, however, to
examine the report prior to the entry of a plea on request of the defense and the
prosecution.
Accord, FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(1): "The [presentence] report shall not be submitted to the court
or its contents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or
has been found guilty, except that a judge may, with the written consent ofthe defendant, inspect a
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imposed if the defendant pleaded guilty, and the sentence the defendant could
expect to receive if tried and convicted. 136 Thus, the defendant would know in
advance of a plea the sentence to be received, and the extent of any benefit to
be derived from pleading guilty. Finally, assuming no conference were held,
the judge would be limited to inquiring whether it would be useful137to have an
adjournment for the purpose of discussing a disposition by plea.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, change nationwide in plea bargaining procedures has
been rapid. Although plea bargaining has been a part of the criminal justice
system for a long time, it is just within the past ten to fifteen years that it has
become highly visible, so that now plea agreements are routinely announced
in court and made a part of the record. It is also within this time that the
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that plea bargaining exists,
and has pronounced the practice to be both constitutional and healthy. 138
Procedures for the control of plea bargaining are still in the developmental stage, and calls for reform continue to be voiced, as evidenced by this and
other articles, and by the ABA's reviewed Pleas of Guilty standards. Although
it is undoubtedly perilous to predict the future, my guess is that legislative
changes for the control of plea bargaining will continue in the direction proposed by the ABA-on-the-record, dispassionate judicial participation in plea
negotiations. There is too much evidence that judges presently are involved in
plea negotiations to expect that their participation will be ended, 139 and it is
contrary to the trend toward greater accountability to think that the ABA's call
for recordation will be ignored. Perhaps the amendments to the ABA's revised
standards suggested in this Article also will be found persuasive.
It is not entirely clear what effect the movement toward determinate sentencing laws will have on plea bargaining. 140 Theoretically, such laws should
presentence report at any time." (Emphasis added.) In North Carolina, the defendant may move
for a presentence investigation prior to conviction. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1332(b) (1978).
If the judge examines a preplea report but a guilty plea is not subsequently entered, the
defendant should be accorded the right to have the case tried by a different judge. The Yale
proposal, Note, supra note 57, at 302, agrees with this proposition, as does Alsehuler, Alschuler,
Judge's Role, supra note 2, at 1148. In North Carolina a continuance to another session of court
with a new judge would appear to be consistent with the spirit of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A1023(b), 1025 (1978). See note 33 supra for further discussion of this issue.
136. Only if otherwise unknown facts adverse to the defendant were disclosed at trial would
the judge be free to impose a more severe sentence than previously announced. Cf.Note, supra
note 57, at 301-02 (judge must announce two dispositions, with the sentence entered upon a guilty
plea calculated uniformly using a specific discount rate); Alschuler, Judge'sRole, supra note 2, at
1148 (same proposal); Miller, supra note 1, at ch. IV-28 (same proposal, but would be used only if
parties unable to reach a sentence agreement without a judicial conference; if an agreement is
reached between the parties, judge could not announce alternative sentence). See discussion of
these proposals at note 91 and accompanying text supra.
137. This recommendation is found in ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 143.3(e). See text accompanying note 115 supra.
138. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
139. See, eg., Alschuler, Judge'rRole, supra note 2, at 1061-99, 1149, 1151-52. But see NAC
COURTS, supra note 2, Standards 3.1, 3.7.
140. One possibility is that the move to determinate sentencing will force a transfer of sentenc-
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have an impact because they narrow the sentencing discretion available to the
trial judge, and thus the plea negotiating room of the parties. If the situation
in North Carolina is typical, however, there may be considerable difference
between theory and reality. The North Carolina legislature has approved a

determinate sentencing law scheduled to take effect on July 1, 1981.141 The
statute specifically provides, however, that the prosecution and defense may

continue to negotiate concerning whether "a prison term different from the
presumptive prison term applicable to the defendant

' 14 2

should be imposed,

and the court is authorized to consider as a mitigating factor in support of
giving less than the presumptive sentence that the defendant pleaded guilty as

part of a negotiated plea. 14 3 Given the pervasiness of plea bargaining in
ing discretion from the judiciary to the prosecutor, thus enhancing the prosecutor's bargaining
position. See Alsehuler, supra note 90, at 566. Alschuler suggests that when a system of fixed or
presumptive sentencing is instituted, plea bargaining should be altered by replacing the prosecutor's sentencing power with a legislative statement of the exact reward to be given for a guilty plea.
Id at 575. The purpose of the several varieties of determinate sentencing proposals is to assure
that similarly situated defendants are treated similarly and that sentencing disparities are reduced.
It is unclear, however, that these results necessarily will obtain, as a prosecutor, in arriving at plea
bargains, generally is more interested in "securing a conviction than [in] achieving equity among
similar situated defendants." ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 135, at 18-28.
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1 to -1340.7 (Supp. 1979), as amended by Fair Sentencing
Act, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. SEss. LAws, IstSess., 850, and Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1316, 1979 N.C.
SESs. LAws, 2d Sess. 247. A key part of the statute reads as follows:
(a). . .If the judge imposes a prison term. . . the judge must impose the presumptive prison term provided by subsection (f) of this section [for class C through Class J
felonies] unless he decides to impose a longer or shorter term after consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. In imposing a prison term on a person convicted of a
felony, the sentencing judge may consider any aggravating and mitigating factors that
are reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing as provided by G.S. 15A-1340.3, and
must consider each of the following aggravating and mitigating factors.
[Statute then sets forth factors concerning the nature of the offense, the defendant's
role in the offense, defendant's prior record, defendant's mental or physical condition,
whether any restitution was made, and the existence of a plea arrangement.]
(b) If the judge imposes a prison term for a felony that differs from the presumptive term provided by subsection (f). . .the judge must enter on the record findings of
fact regarding all aggravating and mitigating factors on which he bases his sentence.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §I5A-1340A(a), (b) (Supp. 1979).
142. Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, § 3, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, IstSess. 850. This amendment
to the state's plea negotiation statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(a) (1979), was to become effective on July 1, 1980. Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1316, § 47, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 252
changed the effective date to March 1, 1981, the date the State's Fair Sentencing Act was scheduled to take effect. See generally Clarke, An Update on the FairSentencing Act, in ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE MEMORANDA, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
AT CHAPEL HILL (Nov. 1980). The amendment will change § 15A-1021(a) to read:

(a) In superior court, the prosecution and the defense may discuss the possibility
that, upon the defendant's entry of a plea of guilty or no contest to one or more offenses,
the prosecutor will not charge, will dismiss, or will move for the dismissal of other
not oppose a particular sentence, including aprison term
charges,
or willthe
recommend
dfferent from
presumptiveorprison
term applicable to the defendant, f convicted under
G.S JSA-J340.4(/. If the defendant is represented by counsel in the discussion the defendant need not be present. The trial judge may participate in the discussions.

(Amended portion in italics). See note 18 supra (text of unamended version of statute).
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(i) (Supp. 1979). Id -1340.4(b)) requires that the
judge record all aggravating and mitigating factors that influenced his decision. See note 141
s
dpra.
A proposal has been made to amend § 15A-1340.4(b) to provide that a judge need not
make any findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors
imposes a prison term pursuant to a plea arrangement under Article 58 of the Chapter, regardless of the length of the term, or
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North Carolina, and this specific recognition in the state's determinate sentencing law, it seems certain that plea bargaining practices will survive the new
legislation substantially intact. 144 This means, of course, that reform of the
state's plea negotiation statute should become a major priority of the state's
Criminal Code Commission and of the legislature.

if he imposes the presumptive term." S. 1066, N.C. 1979 Session, 2d Sess. § 35 (1980). If adopted,
this proposal seemingly would have the effect of exempting plea arrangements approved by the
judge from the terms of the Fair Sentencing Act. The judge would be free to ignore presumptive
sentences without the requirement of having to justify departure from the presumptive term.
144. In fact, plea bargaining may emerge even stronger. See note 140 supra. Alschuler forcefully argues this position. See Alschuler, supra note 90, at 563-76. Moreover, if the proposed
amendment to North Carolina's Fair Sentencing Act, see note 143 supra, is approved, the determinate sentencing provisions apparently will be bypassed by the plea bargaining process.
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APPENDIX
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
AT
CHAPEL HILL
SCHOOL OF LAW

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Van Hecke-Wettach Hall 064 A
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514

June 23, 1977
Hon.
Superior Court Judge

Dear Judge
I am a professor at the University of North Carolina School of Law and
am presently engaged in a study of plea bargaining practices in the North
Carolina Superior Courts. Upon completion of my research, I plan to prepare
an article which describes plea bargaining procedures in felony cases. In all
likelihood, the article also will contain suggestions for re-drafting the North
Carolina law relating to plea bargaining.
A major focus of my research is the role which the trial judge plays in the
plea bargaining process. As you know, the North Carolina statutes were
amended in 1975 and now specifically authorize the trial judge to participate
in plea negotiations. Last summer, in an effort to acquire first-hand information on plea bargaining practices under the new law, I spent considerable time
in one judicial district observing court proceedings and interviewing judges,
prosecutors and defense attorneys. Based upon my observations and interviews, I have prepared the enclosed questionnaire which I am sending to all
Superior Court judges. A primary purpose of the questionnaire is to determine whether my findings of last summer are an accurate reflection of practices throughout the state.
I do hope that you will take the few minutes necessary to complete the
questionnaire and that you will return it to me as soon as possible in the enclosed, self-addresed stamped envelope. If you are uncertain about any aspect
of the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to call me collect (area code 919,
933-5106). I assure you that I will not use names of judges in my article; furthermore, responses to the questionnaire will in all other respects be kept confidential.
Your cooperation in completing the questionnaire is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Norman Lefstein
Enclosure
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STUDY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN SUPERIOR COURT
FELONY CASES
Explanatory note:
Several of the questions concern subjects for which precise statistical data
is not available. Accordingly, you are asked to make percentage estimates and
it is hoped that you will not be hesitant to do so. Your estimates will not be
reported as anything more than what they are, i.e., guesses which necessarily
involve some potential for error. As the time frame for your answers, please
use the last two years (July 1, 1975 - July 1, 1977). With respect to all of the
questions, if you need additional room in which to write, please use the lines
provided at the end of the questionnaire.

1. In what percentage of the cases in which guilty pleas are entered are you
presented with agreements relating to the defendant's sentence, i.e., the
defense attorney and the prosecutor have agreed on a sentence which the
prosecutor "recommends" that the court impose or there is a so-called
"agreed upon sentence," where the prosecutor and the defense attorney
have agreed on the sentence which the defendant should receive?
__0%
__.1%-10%
-. 11%-20%
- 21%-30%
31%-40%
__41%-50%
. 51%-60%
-61%-70%
__71%-80%
-81%-90%
-_91%-99%
100%
Please feel free to use the percentage ranges shown above in responding to
question two.
2.

If you are sometimes presented with plea agreements relating to the defendant's sentence:
(a) In what percentage of these plea agreement cases are you first advised of the agreement in chambers?*
%
In what percentage of these plea agreement cases are you first advised of the agreement in the courtroom?
%

* Throughout the questionnaire, "chambers" is intended to include any area outside of the
courtroom.

1981]

PLEA BARG41NING

(b) In what percentage of these plea agreement cases do you accept,
without modification, the proposed sentence? __%

If you do sometimes urge modifications in the sentence, please briefly
indicate the nature or types of modifications you commonly suggest?

(c) If there are discussions in chambers concerning proposed sentences,
in what percentage of the cases are the defendants present and able to
listen to everything that is said pertaining to the case?

%

If there are discussions in chambers concerning proposed sentences,
in what percentage of the cases does a court reporter record everything that is said pertaining to the case?

%

(d) If there are discussions in the courtroom at the bench concerning
proposed sentences, in what percentage of the cases are the defendants present and able to listen to everything that is said pertaining to
the case?

%

If there are discussions in the courtroom at the bench concerning
proposed sentences, in what percentage of the cases does a court reporter record everything that is said pertaining to the case?

If there are discussions in open court concerning proposed sentences,
in what percentage of the cases does a court reporter record everything that is said pertaining to the case?

%

3. Question one refers to "recommended sentences" and "agreed upon
sentences." Do you believe there is a difference in plea bargains where the
solicitor "recommends" a sentence as opposed to plea bargains where the
defense attorney and solicitor state that the sentence is "agreed upon" or
that the plea is "conditioned upon" the defendant receiving the proposed
sentence?
Yes
No
Please briefly explain why you believe the two types of plea agreements
are the same or your understanding as to how they differ:

4. In cases where you believe that settlement without trial is desirable, do

528

NORTH CAROLIN4 LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 59

you initiate and/or participate in plea discussions shortly before or during
the trial?
Always __Almost Always
Sometimes _ Rarely
Never
If you do initiate and/or participate in plea discussions shortly before or
during the trial:
(a) Are the plea discussions recorded by a court reporter?
__Always
Almost Always
Sometimes ___Rarely

Never

(b) Is the defendant present and able to listen to everything that is said
pertaining to the plea discussions?
__Always
Almost Always
Sometimes __Rarely
Never
(c) How often do such plea discussions result in guilty pleas?
_Always
Almost Always
Sometimes _ Rarely ___Never
5. Do you favor the North Carolina Law [§ 15A-1021(a)] which authorizes
judicial participation in plea discussions?
_Yes _ Not Certain
No
As a matter of practice, do you initiate and/or participate in plea discussions with defense counsel and prosecutors concerning proposed sentences
for defendants?
Always __Almost Always
Sometimes __Rarely
Never
6. The American Bar Association Standards Relating to Guilty Pleas, § 1.8,
state that it is "proper for the court to grant charge and sentence concessions to defendants who enter a plea of guilty. . . when the interest of the
public in the effective administration of criminal justice would thereby be
served." Do you sentence defendants who plead guilty less harshly than
you do defendants who go to trial?
Always _ Almost Always
Sometimes _ Rarely
Never
7. In cases in which defendants enter guilty pleas:
(a) Do you take testimony from one or more witnesses concerning the
crime to which the defendant has pled guilty?
__Always
Almost Always
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
(b) Do you sentence the defendant on the same day on which the guilty
plea is entered.
A__lways
Almost Always
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
(c)

Do you have available some kind of a presentence report for your
consideration in pronouncing sentence?
__Always
Almost Always
Sometimes ___Rarely
Never

8. Does it sometimes occur that you preside over trials after you have re-
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jected plea agreements relating to sentence tendered to you by the parties?
Yes
No
If your answer is yes, on how many different occasions during the past two
years has this occurred?

_

Are the number of occasions listed an

estimate?
Yes
No
9. Please briefly describe the beneficial and detrimental changes which have
occurred in plea practices since enactment of the state's new plea bargaining legislation:

Your personal comments involving either plea bargaining or any of the
foregoing questions would be greatly appreciated. Please use the reverse side
of this page if additional room is needed:

Date

Judge

I

